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I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of DNA testing, numerous issues have arisen in
regard to obtaining and using evidence that results from such testing.
As courts have come to regard DNA testing as a reliable method for
linking some people to crimes and for exonerating others, these issues
are especially significant.1 The federal government and most states have
The author is the Dean Julius Isaacson Professor at the University of Baltimore School
of Law. He would like to thank Matthew Gannett and Erika Flaschner for their invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1
See Lisa Carrabino, Note, The Admissibility of DNA Typing and Statistical Probability
Evidence, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 473, 495 n.156 (1995) (citing State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 468
(Mont. 1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gollehon, 906 P.2d 697 (Mont. 1995); State
v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512 (Wash. 1993) (en banc); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985,
986–88 (Sup. Ct. 1989)) (discussing the admissibility of DNA testing in the states); see also
Veronia Valdivieso, Note, DNA Warrants: A Panacea for Old Rape Cases?, 90 GEO. L.J. 1009,
1021 n.98 (2002) (referencing cases such as Smith v. Deppish, 807 P.2d 144, 159 (Kan. 1991);
Mandujano v. State, 799 S.W.2d 318, 321–22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Snowden v. State, 574 So.
2d 960, 966 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989)).
*
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enacted statutes that permit or direct the testing of those convicted of
certain crimes.2 Courts have almost universally approved such testing,
rejecting arguments that obtaining and using such evidence violates the
Fourth Amendment.3
More recently, the government has enacted laws permitting or
directing the taking of DNA samples from those arrested for, but not yet
convicted of, certain serious crimes.4 Courts had been far more divided
about the constitutionality of DNA testing for arrestees than they were
for the comparable testing of those already convicted.5 Given the
division in the holdings among both state and federal courts and the
increasing importance of DNA evidence in criminal investigations, it is
hardly surprising that the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case
regarding the constitutionality of a Maryland statute allowing for such
testing.6
2
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006) (listing the crimes that require arrestees to have a
DNA sample taken); see also Richard Williams & Sarah Hammond, Building Forensic
Technology Capacity, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS. 17–19 (2009), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/cj/forensictechnology09.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/LSK2-FPU6 (providing a list of states and the crimes that require
arrestees to provide DNA samples in each).
3
See, e.g., State v Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 43 (Md. 2004) (upholding the Maryland DNA
Collection Act); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the Wisconsin
DNA collection law); Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413–14 (5th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (upholding the federal DNA collection law); Velasquez v. Woods,
329 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (upholding the Texas DNA collection law);
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 76–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the Connecticut DNA
collection law); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
Colorado DNA collection law); Schlicher v. Peters 103 F.3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996)
(upholding the Kansas DNA collection law); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305–08 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992) (upholding the Virginia DNA collection law).
Additionally, some federal district courts have upheld state DNA collection laws. See
Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342–44 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (upholding the Georgia
DNA collection law); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588–89 (D. Minn. 1995)
(upholding the Minnesota DNA collection law).
4
See supra note 2 (listing examples of crimes that require DNA sampling for arrestees
according to federal law).
5
For cases upholding the DNA testing of arrestees to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), see United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d
387, 415–16 (3rd Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir.
2010), vacated on other grounds 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011); Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476,
482–83 (Az. 2012); Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1189–90 (N.D. Ca. 2009); and
Anderson v. Virginia, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706–08 (Va. 2007). For cases invalidating such testing,
see Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 860 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Purdy, 2005 WL
3465721 (D. Neb. 2005); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782 (2011), review granted and
opinion superseded by 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011); and King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549,
580–81 (Md. 2012).
6
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (scrutinizing a Maryland statue regarding the
constitutionality of DNA testing).
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The Court decided in Maryland v. King (King II) that DNA testing of
arrestees and the use of the samples obtained by those tests to identify
the subjects of the testing and to link them to other criminal activity does
Unfortunately, the Court’s
not violate the Fourth Amendment.7
justification for this conclusion focused primarily on the use of the
samples to identify the arrestee, specifically to make sure that the person
under arrest was either who he claimed to be or was shown to be
through fingerprint comparison.8 While identification is one purpose of
DNA testing, law enforcement generally acknowledges that the most
valuable use of DNA samples is to compare them with samples found at
the scenes of serious crimes.9 Such a comparison helps solve unsolved
crimes, leads to the arrest and conviction of those responsible for such
crimes and the exoneration of those who may have been wrongfully
charged or convicted.10 The Court in King II spent comparatively little
time on the constitutionality of this vital purpose for DNA testing and
either omitted or responded without sufficient depth to many of the
arguments that had been raised in opposition to DNA testing of
arrestees.11 As such, the opinion in King II was somewhat disingenuous.
This disingenuousness provided fodder for critics of this DNA testing
such as Justice Scalia, whose dissent in King II mocked the Court’s
emphasis on identification as the purpose of the testing.12
The overall failure of the Court to respond to arguments raised by
lower courts and commentators to DNA testing of arrestees is
particularly unfortunate because there are persuasive responses to those
arguments and sound reasoning why such testing complies with the
Fourth Amendment.13 The arguments advanced by opponents of DNA
testing of arrestees fall basically into two categories.14 The first category
relates to the presumption of innocence.15 In distinguishing between the
DNA testing of those already convicted of crimes, and those who have
only been arrested, some courts and commentators have emphasized
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
See infra Part VII.A (discussing the “primary purpose” test and its application to
statutes that require arrestees to have DNA samples collected).
9
See infra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing DNA sample statutes that do not
limit use of the results).
10
See infra Part V.A.2 (explaining the second step in the reasonableness balancing test).
11
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (demonstrating the Court’s focus).
12
See infra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (analyzing Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Maryland v. King).
13
See infra Parts VI & VII (conveying the arguments for the constitutionality of DNA
testing).
14
See generally King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1966–80 (advancing all arguments surrounding DNA
testing).
15
Id. at 1974.
7
8
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that the latter group of individuals is bathed in the presumption of
innocence.16 While this is certainly the case, this Article argues that the
principles related to the presumption have little, if any, relevance to the
constitutionality of DNA testing of arrestees.17
The second category of arguments advanced in opposition to the
DNA testing of arrestees revolves around the criteria adopted by the
Supreme Court to assess the legality of government intrusions into areas
protected by the Fourth Amendment when there is no individualized
suspicion that would justify a search or seizure.18 These arguments focus
on the balancing test the Court uses in such searches and seizures—that
is, analyzing the extent of the government intrusion involved and
balancing it against the societal need to conduct such intrusions.19 This
Article will posit that when the statute enabling the DNA testing of
arrestees is limited in scope, as is the Maryland statute at issue in King II,
the benefits to be achieved by such testing outweigh the minor intrusion
to the arrestees.20 The other argument regarding searches and seizures
without individualized suspicion relies on previous decisions of the
Supreme Court which held some such suspicionless searches to be in
violation of the Fourth Amendment if their primary purpose was to
ferret out evidence of a crime rather than achieve some other societal
benefit.21 This Article demonstrates that such holdings are inconsistent,
confusing, and incompatible with the principles on which the Fourth
Amendment is based.22
Additionally, an important factor in the Court’s application of the
balancing test has been whether the subject of the search or seizure has a
diminished expectation of privacy.23 The Court has given greater
latitude to government agencies to conduct intrusions into areas
normally considered protected by the Fourth Amendment when the
targets of those searches or seizures have a diminished expectation of
privacy.24 Those who are arrested and placed in full custodial facilities,
See infra Part IV (conveying the constitutional argument against DNA sampling).
See infra Part IV (elaborating on the presumption of innocence).
18
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1981.
19
See infra Part V.A.1–3 (discussing the extent of intrusion of DNA testing); see also
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (describing the balancing test and how it is
applied to cases).
20
See infra Part VI (demonstrating the several crimes that have been solved because of
DNA testing).
21
See infra notes 352–62 and accompanying text (discussing the “closely regulated
business doctrine,” which allows states to address social problems by both an
administrative scheme and thorough penal sanctions).
22
See infra Part V.A.1–3 (advancing arguments surrounding DNA testing).
23
See infra Part VI (addressing privacy expectations).
24
See infra Part VI (assessing an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy).
16
17
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such as jails, have a significantly diminished expectation of privacy and
therefore are more susceptible to certain intrusions on their Fourth
Amendment rights, especially when those intrusions are effected in a
non-arbitrary manner.25
DNA testing has played an important role in leading to the release
and even exoneration of an increasing number of those who have been
convicted of serious crimes.26 For various reasons, prosecutors have
often argued, often successfully, against obtaining DNA samples from
those convicted of crimes and comparing them to the samples found at
other crime scenes.27 This opposition is for the most part unfortunate, as
defense attorneys and various innocence projects have successfully used
these results to demonstrate the innocence of those convicted of serious
crimes, or at least show a reasonable doubt of a convicted individual’s
guilt.28
There is something to be said for the notion that because DNA
science has been shown to be reliable when the testing process is done
correctly, its use should be maximized with respect to insuring that the
right perpetrators are convicted as often as possible for any crime where
DNA evidence is available. Unless absolutely necessary, there should be
as few barriers as possible to the use of such critical evidence by
prosecutors or defendants. In our constitutional system, a goose and
gander argument such as this one, has its limits. Regardless of the
probative value of certain evidence, if the government obtains it through
means prohibited by constitutional protections, such as those embodied
in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, the evidence should not be
available to the government.29 To some extent, this conclusion leads in a
25
See infra Part V.A.3 (expressing concern that searches without individualized
suspicion that are conducted at the discretion of officers may be arbitrary).
26
See infra Part V.B (explaining the second step in the reasonableness balancing test
which looks at the nature of the government interest).
27
See Shaila Dewan, Prosecutors Block Access to DNA Testing for Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (May
17, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/us/18dna.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=1&, archived at http://perma.cc/6CSK-SPJD (reporting on DNA exonerations). In
2009, the New York Times reported that:
A recent analysis of 225 DNA exonerations by Brandon L. Garrett, a
professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, found that
prosecutors opposed DNA testing in almost one out of five cases. In
many of the others, they initially opposed testing but ultimately agreed
to it. In 98 of those 225 cases, the DNA test identified the real culprit.
Id.
28
See infra Part V.B (explaining that the second step of the reasonableness balancing test
evaluates the nature of the government interest).
29
See generally U.S. CONST. amends. IV–VI (providing the text of the aforementioned
amendments, including the right against search and seizure, the right against selfincrimination, and the right to a public and speedy trial).
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circular manner back to the original assessment of whether DNA testing
of arrestees violates constitutional protections.30 That is not to say,
however, that either society or the courts should minimize the benefits to
be achieved by enhancing the likelihood of convicting the guilty and
exonerating the innocent.
Part II of this Article provides a brief description of the science of
DNA testing as it is used in the criminal justice system.31 Part III
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in King II.32 Part IV addresses
the argument of the opponents that DNA testing of arrestees violates the
presumption of innocence.33 The chief focus of the Article appears in
Parts V, VI, and VII, which responds to the arguments posed by those
who claim such testing violates the Fourth Amendment.34 Part V
addresses the balancing test for such searches and seizures long
employed by the Supreme Court.35 Parts VI and VII describe and
critique the use of the primary purpose test as an important factor in
determining whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated.36 This
test looks to whether the primary purpose of the government’s search or
seizure was something other than to ferret out ordinary criminal
wrongdoing, and only in such situations excuses the absence of
individualized suspicion.37
In advocating a method to apply the Fourth Amendment in a
manner that is both more consistent than the current approach and more
faithful to the principles of the Fourth Amendment, this Article analyzes
the constitutionality of DNA testing of arrestees for the purpose of using
those results to compare with DNA found at the scenes of serious
crimes.38 This analysis leads to the conclusion that such government
conduct complies with the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment
and other constitutional protections when such testing is done pursuant
to statutes that remove arbitrariness and limit the use of the DNA

See infra Parts V–VII (conducting a constitutional analysis of DNA testing arrestees).
See infra Part II (introducing DNA testing).
32
See infra Part III (including a case discussion of Maryland v. King).
33
See infra Part IV (discussing an arrestee’s presumption of innocence).
34
See infra Parts V & VI (explaining both the balancing test for reasonableness and the
diminished expectation of privacy).
35
See infra Part V (including a discussion of the balancing test for reasonableness, which
focuses on the extent of the intrusion).
36
See infra Parts VI & VII (providing explanation of the diminished expectation of
privacy and the primary purpose test).
37
See infra notes 352–62 and accompanying text (discussing the “closely regulated
business doctrine,” which allows states to address social problems by both an
administrative scheme and thorough penal sanctions).
38
See infra Part V.B (elaborating on the use of DNA evidence to solve other crimes).
30
31
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samples.39 More broadly, this Article critiques some of the ways in
which the diminished expectation of privacy rationale and the primary
purpose doctrine have been used by the Supreme Court in assessing the
constitutionality of searches and seizures performed without
individualized suspicion.
II. TESTING OF DNA
“Deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) is a complex molecule contained
within each nucleated cell of the human body . . . [that] provides a
complete blueprint for the human being.”40 During reproduction,
chromosomes from the mother and father combine to create a new and
unique genetic structure.41 With the exception of identical twins, no two
individuals have identical DNA.42 DNA testing can determine the
variations of DNA structure in each individual.43
DNA collection for comparison purposes in criminal cases is done in
one of two primary ways. First, it may be accomplished by drawing
blood.44 Currently the FBI collects blood by a finger-prick.45 Second, it
may be done by rubbing two cotton swabs up and down the inside of
each of the suspect’s cheeks with enough pressure to remove cells.46 If
necessary, reasonable force may be used to obtain a DNA sample.47
Samples are sent to the appropriate laboratory for testing.48 The samples
are then analyzed in accordance with FBI standards and CODIS
requirements.49 CODIS, or the Combined DNA Index System, blends
forensic science and computer technology by storing DNA profiles at the
local, state, and national level.50 Data stored at the national level is kept
See infra Part VIII (advancing the constitutionality of DNA testing).
8 AM. JUR. 3d, Foundation for DNA Fingerprint Evidence § 3 (1990 & Supp. 2014).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(f)(1) (2011) (stating that approved methods of DNA
collection may include blood draws); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.20 (West 2012) (providing
that individuals convicted of sexual offenses shall have a blood sample drawn for DNA
testing).
45
See 73 Fed. Reg. 74,935 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 28).
46
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(f)(1) (stating that approved methods of DNA collection may
include the use of buccal swabs); MARCUS L. BROWN ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE 22 (2012), available at https://www.mdsp.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=UUXGHnwBnBs%3D&tabid=429&mid=1122, archived at https://perma.cc/3JKFTCC2.
47
28 C.F.R. § 28.12(d) (2011); MD. CODE REGS. § 29.05.01.04(C) (2011).
48
28 C.F.R. § 28.12(f)(2) (2011); MD. CODE REGS. § 29.05.01.04(D) (2011).
49
28 C.F.R. § 28.13 (2011); MD. CODE REGS. § 29.05.01.04(A) (2011).
50
What is CODIS?, NAT’L INST. JUST. (July 16, 2010), available at http://www.nij.gov/
journals/266/Pages/backlogs-codis.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/93ER-WE86.
39
40
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in the National DNA Index System, or NDIS.51 CODIS was designed to
compare a target DNA record against the DNA records contained in the
database.52 If a match is identified by CODIS, the laboratories involved
in the match exchange information to verify the match and establish
coordination between the two agencies.53
DNA analysis is done by using a Polymerase Chain Reaction
(“PCR”) to amplify the DNA strands and analyze Short Tandem Repeats
(“STRs”).54 Specifically, the analysis focuses on thirteen core STRs.55
Analysis of these strands reveals the combinations of uniquely paired
protein bases within the human genome which may be used to match the
DNA taken from an individual to the DNA left at a crime scene.56 The
thirteen STR strands are referred to as “junk sites” because they are not
associated with any physical or medical characteristics.57
Numerous steps have been taken by law enforcement agencies to
assure that DNA testing will not reveal private information about the
subject of the testing while assuring accurate results.58 To ensure that the
DNA profile of a convicted offender will not be disclosed, Congress and
many states have passed statutory rules, which provide that DNA
samples and analyses may only be used for identification purposes.59
Further, the thirteen “junk sites” were specifically selected for analysis
because they do not control or influence the expression of any trait.60
This manner of DNA analysis does not reveal information relating to
medical conditions or other traits.61 Indeed, the system provides a
“genetic fingerprint, which uniquely identifies an individual, but does

Id.
CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, FBI, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/
biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 13, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/KX2S-Q4A3 [hereinafter CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet].
53
Id.
54
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing buccal swabs as an appropriate
method for collecting DNA samples).
55
Mary McCarthy, Am I My Brother's Keeper?: Familial DNA Searches in the Twenty-First
Century, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 384 (2011).
56
Id. There are literally trillions of different possible base pair combinations. Id.
57
H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000).
58
See, e.g., MD. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2009) (listing the procedure necessary to get a DNA
sample).
59
42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (2006); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-505(b)(1) (2011); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 295.1 (West 2012); see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-310.2–3 (West 2012) (stating
that DNA shall be analyzed “to determine identification characteristics”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 53:1-20.21 (West 2012) (permitting DNA testing for law enforcement identification or
other non-intrusive purposes).
60
See McCarthy, supra note 55, at 384 (explaining what information is contained in a
strand of DNA).
61
Id.
51
52
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not provide a basis for determining or inferring anything else about the
person.”62 Additionally, under federal and several state statutes, no
names or other personal identifiers are stored with the DNA analysis,
and access to the records is limited to ensure confidentiality.63 Most
statutes require that DNA records be destroyed or expunged if the
criminal action does not result in a conviction, a conviction is reversed,
or if the individual is granted an unconditional pardon.64 Finally, failure
to properly expunge DNA records or to otherwise comply with privacy
requirements can result in fines and/or imprisonment.65
It is extremely unlikely for DNA testing to result in false positive
identifications and comparisons.66 When analyzing the thirteen STRs,
the probability of a random match of DNA evidence found at a crime
scene and a DNA sample are between one in a billion and one in a
quadrillion.67 Thus, DNA testing can identify an individual with more
than 99% accuracy.68
The reliability of DNA testing is an important factor when using the
balancing test employed by courts to determine if a search or seizure
performed without some degree of individualized suspicion meets the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.69 As discussed in Part V, one
factor in that test is the importance of the government need to conduct

62
Id.; see also CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 52 (discussing the purpose of
CODIS and NDIS).
63
See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-511(a)(1) (2011) (providing a state statute that
discusses the identifying information available from DNA testing); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 299.5–299.7 (West 2012) (explaining the identifying information made available by DNA
samples); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.6 (West 2012) (providing federal and state statutes
regarding the identifying information DNA samples make available).
64
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-511(a)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-310.7; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.25 (West 2012).
65
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, § 2-512 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.7; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 53:1-20.26. All of these statutes relay the penalty for disclosing information in the
DNA database. Anyone who intentionally and wrongfully discloses information in the
DNA database is guilty of a disorderly person offense, which is a misdemeanor that can
carry a prison sentence of up to six months. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-8 (demonstrating
the increased jail time for disorderly conduct).
66
See BROWN ET AL., supra note 46 (advancing the rarity of a false positive).
67
Id.
68
See Randy James, A Brief History of DNA Testing, TIME (June 19, 2009), available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1905706,00.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/FGN7-FZUU (discussing the growth of DNA testing since it began in 1985 and
how now, forensic testing can determine distinctive patterns in DNA with 99% accuracy);
see also MD. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (2011) (codifying the Maryland statute that covers DNA
testing and the preservation of scientific evidence).
69
See infra Part V.B (demonstrating that reliability supports a strong government interest
argument).

668

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

such an intrusion.70 Because DNA testing is so reliable, it can play a
major role in linking an arrestee to a serious crime or a definitive role in
exonerating someone of that crime.71 The government interest in
conducting such testing is therefore quite substantial.
III. MARYLAND V. KING
In 2009, Alonzo King was arrested in Maryland for the crime of
assault in the first degree.72 Under a Maryland statute providing for the
DNA testing of those about to be detained after being charged with
certain felonies, King had a sample of his DNA taken.73 The process
used to obtain the sample involved swabbing King’s cheek with a cotton
cloth.74 The sample was then entered into CODIS.75 After comparative
analysis, King’s sample was found to match the DNA found at the scene
of a 2003 rape.76 Based in part on this sample and another DNA sample
of King taken later, which also matched the DNA at the rape scene, King
was subsequently indicted and convicted of rape.77 The Maryland Court
of Appeals overturned King’s conviction holding that the part of the
statute authorizing the taking of DNA samples from arrestees violated
the Fourth Amendment.78 As both federal and state courts were divided

See infra Part V.A (discussing the extent of intrusion of DNA testing).
See infra Part VI (illustrating the importance of DNA in both acquittals and
convictions).
72
See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013) (describing the nature of
King’s crime).
73
See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(i) (2009) (requiring that an “individual
convicted of a felony or a violation of § 6-205 or § 6-206 of the Criminal Law Article shall
have a DNA sample collected either at the time of sentence or on intake to a correctional
facility, if the individual is sentenced to a term of imprisonment”); see also King II, 133 S. Ct.
at 1966 (providing that booking personnel used a sample from King’s cheek pursuant to the
provision of the Maryland DNA Collection act).
74
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1965.
75
See supra Part II (discussing the testing of DNA and what the testing process entails);
see also King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (providing that the Combined DNA Index system was
authorized by Congress and supervised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation). The
CODIS system connects DNA laboratories at the local, state, and national level. Id.
76
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968 (providing that King’s identification as the rapist was in part
a result of a national project to standardize the collection and storage of DNA profiles).
77
See id. at 1965 (stating that the DNA taken from King was found to match the DNA
taken from the 2003 Salisbury rape victim and that as a result of the match, King was tried
and convicted of rape).
78
See King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 555–56 (Md. 2012) (holding that the
Maryland DNA Collection act is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment totality of
the circumstances balancing test).
70
71
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over the constitutionality of such procedures, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in King II.79
After describing the process by which DNA is taken and tested, the
reliability of the results and the specifics of the Maryland statute, the
Court turned to the critical issue of whether the search and seizure of the
DNA sample satisfied the test for reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment.80 As the Court notes, this test requires balancing the extent
of the government’s interest in the procedure against the degree of
intrusion to the individual.81 The Court asserted that the primary
interest of the government consisted of establishing the identity of the
arrestee and obtaining the important benefits that flow from verifying
this identity.82 First, the Court alluded to the importance of identifying
arrestees to reveal their “public persona” and thus let the police know
their criminal history.83 Comparing this purpose to the taking of
fingerprints, the Court said the only difference between DNA samples
and other means of establishing identity is the “unparalleled accuracy”
of DNA results.84 The Court then discussed the need to know who the
arrestee is and his criminal history.85 This is necessary to determine
where and under what conditions the arrestee should be housed, to
inform the decision about how dangerous the individual is, and what, if
any, bail is needed to insure his appearances in court.86 Finally, and
unfortunately with minimal analysis, the Court credited the use of DNA
79
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1965 (providing that the Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled
that the DNA taken from King’s booking was an unreasonable search of the person).
80
See id. at 1968–69 (describing that even though the DNA swab procedure presents an
issue that has not yet been before the Court, the framework for deciding the issue is well
established under the Fourth Amendment).
81
Id. at 1970 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)); see infra Part
V.A.1 (analyzing the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment,
focusing on physical intrusions).
82
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (addressing the fact that the legitimate government
interest served by collecting the DNA is that law enforcement officers must identify the
persons they take into custody); infra Part VII (providing information regarding the
primary purpose test and how it relates to the DNA testing of arrestees).
83
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (providing that the data found in official records is used
to produce a comprehensive record of the suspect’s criminal history); infra Part VII
(assessing the primary purpose test and how it relates the DNA testing of arrestees).
84
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1964 (stating that there is an unparalleled accuracy that DNA
provides).
85
See id. at 1971 (discussing that identity encompasses more than simply the name of an
arrestee); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 192 (2004)
(stating that in every criminal case it is necessary to know who has been arrested and who
is being tried); infra Part VII (assessing the primary purpose test and how it relates the
DNA testing of arrestees).
86
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1971–74 (providing that a name holds little value in
comparison to the interest in identifying an individual brought into custody).
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testing with helping to exonerate people who have been wrongly
imprisoned for crimes.87 In such circumstances, presumably a DNA
sample of an arrestee would indicate it was he who committed the crime
for which the wrong person was imprisoned.88
The Court weighed what it regarded as a significant government
interest against the extent of the intrusion resulting from DNA testing.89
It concluded that the physical intrusion caused by the swabbing of the
cheek is minor and the privacy intrusion involved was sufficiently
minimal due to the provisions of the Maryland statute limiting the use of
the results.90 When combined with the diminished expectation of
privacy of one arrested based on probable cause of having committed a
serious crime and about to be confined to a custodial institution, this
intrusion was, according to the Court, outweighed by the government’s
needs to conduct the testing.91
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia, speaking for four justices, said an
integral part of the Fourth Amendment is that no government searches

87
See id. at 1974 (discussing that in the interest of justice, the identification of an arrestee
may have the effect of freeing a person wrongfully convicted). Andrea Roth states in her
article:
One might be forgiven, then, for predicting that an opinion upholding
that law would be an unapologetic paean to the crime-solving virtues
of DNA databases. Yet the five-member King majority devotes only
two sentences to the ability of DNA to solve crimes, and even then, the
mention is simply of the “salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully
imprisoned” for an offense linked to an arrestee through a database
hit. Instead of justifying Maryland's law as a reasonable crime-fighting
measure, the majority reconceptualizes the law as deploying DNA
typing as a “routine booking procedure” and focuses exclusively on
the state's interest in confirming arrestees' identities and determining
arrestees' criminal history before making bail decisions.
Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful, Horrible DNA Revolution in Law
Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 295, 296 (2013).
88
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1974 (discussing that in the interest of justice, the identification
of an arrestee may have the effect of freeing a person wrongfully convicted).
89
See id. at 1977 (comparing the intrusion of the DNA sample to the substantial
governmental interest); infra Part V.A.1 (examining the balancing test for reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment focusing on the extent of the physical intrusion).
90
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (providing that a buccal swab does not increase the
indignity of the circumstances surrounding an arrest); see also infra Part V.A.1 (analyzing
the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment focusing on the extent
of the physical intrusion).
91
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (stating that there are significant state interests in
identifying an individual who is taken into custody); see also infra Part V.B (examining the
balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment focusing on the nature of
the government interest); Lauren Deitrich, Comment, Say Aaah! Maryland v. King Defines
Reasonable Standard for DNA Searches, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 1095, 1097–99 (2015) (discussing the
reasonableness of an individual’s diminished expectation of privacy).
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for evidence of a crime can take place without some form of prior
suspicion.92 He asserted that the only time the Court had previously
permitted such searches or seizures was when the primary purpose of
the government intrusion was other than ordinary crime investigation.93
Justice Scalia then went on to criticize the Court’s effort to distinguish
the purpose of DNA testing from ordinary criminal investigation by the
Court’s characterization of this purpose as “identification.”94 He argued
that much of what a criminal investigation often involves is
identification—the issue involved here—when comparing the DNA
sample of King to that found at the rape scene to determine if he was the
perpetrator of that crime.95 Justice Scalia then mocked the Court’s claim
that the DNA samples were necessary to a quick identification of
arrestees.96 He did so primarily by showing that both the language in
the enabling statute regarding the purpose for taking the samples and
the lengthy process by which King’s DNA sample was taken and tested
rebut this assertion.97 Finally, with respect to the Court’s comparison of
the use of DNA samples and that of fingerprints, Justice Scalia argued
that criminal investigation is the primary purpose of obtaining DNA
samples whereas “fingerprints of arrestees are taken primarily to
identify them (though that process sometimes solves crimes).”98 The
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (illustrating that the Fourth
Amendment forbids searching a person when there is no basis for believing that the person
is guilty of a crime); infra text accompanying notes 93–99 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s
dissent).
93
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1981–82 (stating there are instances where the Court has
permitted searches without individualized suspicion, however, none of those cases include
a search with the primary purpose of detecting criminal wrongdoing); infra Part V.A.1
(scrutinizing the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment focusing
on the extent of the physical intrusion).
94
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1982–83 (providing that the Court elaborated ways that the
DNA search served the special interest of identifying King, but instead the purpose of the
search was to look for evidence that King committed crimes unrelated to his arrest); infra
Part V.A.1 (assessing the balancing test for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
focusing on the extent of the physical intrusion).
95
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1982–83 (elaborating on the ways that the DNA search served
the special interest of identifying King). The Court also posed that the purpose of the
search was to look for evidence that King committed crimes unrelated to his arrest. Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1983.
98
Id. at 1987. The distinction Justice Scalia draws between the purposes of taking
fingerprints from arrestees and taking their DNA is a dubious one. Id. He argues that that
the primary purpose of taking such fingerprints is to identify the arrestee and apparently
these samples just happen to solve crimes as well. King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1982–83. This
minimizes the fact both that “fingerprinting is one the oldest methods of investigating a
crime using science” and that “fingerprints have been the reason for the solving of a vast
amount of cases.” How Fingerprinting Improves Criminal Investigations, PORTLAND ST. U.,
available at http://online.ccj.pdx.edu/resources/news-article/how-fingerprinting92
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remainder of this Article addresses the issues discussed in King II and
others that were either offered minimal treatment or not directly
addressed in the holding.99
IV. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
One argument that has been made against the DNA testing of
arrestees relates to the presumption of innocence.100 States and the
federal government have, for some time, been testing convicted felons to
determine if their DNA matches the DNA found at crime scenes.101 Such
testing has been conducted without any requirement that the tested
individual is suspected of any other crime.102 Both state and federal
courts have almost universally upheld such testing against claims that it
violated the Fourth Amendment.103 Some have argued that similar
testing of those arrested for, but not convicted or not yet convicted of, a
felony is distinguishable from the testing of convicted felons because the

improves-criminal-investigations/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/7Q6A-HLCW; Molly Wolgar et al., Famous Crimes Solved by Fingerprinting,
FINGERPRINTS!, available at http://fingerprintinggsc.weebly.com/famous-crimes-solved-byfingerprinting.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BSB4-29V4.
99
See infra Parts IV–VII (discussing such sections as the presumption of innocence,
balancing test for reasonableness, the diminished expectation of privacy, and the primary
purpose test).
100
See infra Part IV (elaborating on this presumption).
101
See generally CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 52 (discussing the process after
matching DNA with evidence from another crime scene).
102
See infra notes 148–58 and accompanying text (providing that the collection of DNA
samples is also used for solving unrelated crimes).
103
David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial
Searching”, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 130 (2013); see State v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 26 (Md.
2004) (“[E]very other appellate court we have found dealing with the issue [of DNA
collection] has upheld the DNA collection statute at issue before it.”); see also Green v.
Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677–79 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding the Wisconsin DNA collection law);
Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(upholding the federal DNA collection law); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146
(10th Cir. 2003) (upholding the federal DNA collection law); Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d
420, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (preserving the Texas DNA collection law); Roe v.
Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a DNA statute is constitutional);
Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Oklahoma DNA
collection law); Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding the Kansas
DNA collection law); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding
the Colorado DNA collection law); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 305–08 (4th Cir. 1992)
(upholding a Virginia DNA collection law). For some federal district courts that have also
upheld state DNA collection laws, see Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342–44
(N.D. Ga. 2003), upholding the Georgia DNA collection law, and Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F.
Supp. 583, 588–89 (D. Minn. 1995), upholding the Minnesota collection law.
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former group is protected by the presumption of innocence.104 In fact,
the Maryland Court of Appeals decision that was later overturned by the
Supreme Court used part of this reasoning in its opinion invalidating the
DNA testing of arrestees.105
In assessing whether the presumption of innocence should act as a
barrier against the DNA testing of arrestees, one must look at the
meaning of the presumption and its connection, if any, to the Fourth
Amendment and specifically to the expectation of privacy that has come
to define “search.”106 The Supreme Court defined this well-known and
accepted principle of American criminal justice as follows—“[t]he
presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of
the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal
charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty.”107 The
presumption has been applied to various aspects of the criminal trial
such as the burden on the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and the nature of the instructions
given to the jury at the end of the trial.108
The determination regarding the DNA testing of arrestees, however,
involves issues entirely independent of the above enumerated concerns
and protections.109 The questions that arise regarding the
constitutionality of such testing relate to whether the search, seizure, and
use of the arrestee’s DNA are reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.110 Such reasonableness determinations balance the extent
and nature of the governmental intrusion against its need and

People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review granted and
opinion superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011); see Mario W. v. Kaipio, 228 Ariz. 207, 222 (Ct.
App. 2011), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (2012) (Norris, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a
presumption of innocence and that the state failed to justify why it is entitled to invade the
reasonable expectation of privacy).
105
King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 576 (Md. 2012) (reasoning that if the
application of the balancing test of the Fourth Amendment results in a close call when
considering convicted felons, then the balance must tip in favor of the closely held belief of
the presumption of innocence).
106
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 515 (1967) (holding that the government agents in
the case ignored the procedure of antecedent justification). But see United States v. Jones,
132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (including a discussion of the trespass doctrine); Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013) (adding government intrusions that constitute
trespasses undertaken for investigative purposes to the definition of search).
107
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895).
108
Id.
109
Id.; see Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (expanding the inquiry
to focus on reasonableness).
110
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (providing that the ultimate measure of constitutionality
is reasonableness).
104
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importance.111 A critical element in assessing the extent of the intrusion
is a consideration of the expectation of privacy that the subject of the
intrusion has at the moment the search or seizure is executed.112 As
discussed below, one’s status in a total custody facility substantially
diminishes his or her expectation of privacy and, as decisions of the
Supreme Court involving the rights of inmates detained in custodial
institutions have made clear, the presumption of innocence in no way
informs a decision about whether the particular government policy or
procedure being challenged complies with the Fourth Amendment.113
In Bell v. Wolfish, the plaintiffs claimed constitutional violations
stemming from certain conditions of confinement at a New York facility
designed primarily to house pre-trial detainees.114 The Court noted that
such detainees maintain certain constitutional rights, although
diminished, but then uttered a definitive statement regarding the
relevance of the presumption of innocence to any assessment of these
rights.115 After describing the purposes of the presumption, the Court
wrote, “but it has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.”116
This is not to say that conviction of a crime plays no role when assessing
the expectation of privacy that one has, but only that the presumption of
innocence plays no role in that assessment, at least where the subject is
one confined in a total custodial environment.117 The task then is to see
why conviction for a crime may diminish one’s expectation of privacy
and whether similar factors apply to one who has not been convicted but
is in a custodial facility after a criminal arrest.
The issue in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Burlington was whether the highly intrusive body search of a man about
to become a pre-trial detainee violated his Fourth Amendment

111
See id. at 1970 (reasoning that applying traditional standards of reasonableness require
that a court weigh the promotion of a government interest and the degree of which the
search intrudes on an individual’s privacy).
112
See infra Parts V & VI (analyzing the balancing test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment and how it pertains to the diminished expectation of privacy).
113
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing
that an inmate in custody retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest); see also infra
Parts V & VI (analyzing the balancing test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment
and how it pertains to the diminished expectation of privacy).
114
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (providing that the lawsuit was brought as
a class action to challenge numerous confinement conditions at the Metropolitan
Correctional Center).
115
Id. at 535. “Under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished to an
adjudication of guilt . . . .” Id.
116
Id. at 533.
117
See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 538 (delegating lesser rights to those in custody).
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constitutional right.118 In concluding that Florence’s rights were not
violated, the Court analyzed the issues relating to the reasonableness of
the search under the Fourth Amendment, but never referred to the
presumption of innocence as affecting the issues in the case.119 In his
dissent, Justice Breyer argued that a proper balancing test requires
articulable suspicion to conduct the search because the extent of the
intrusion was so substantial.120 Interestingly though, as with the
majority opinion, Justice Breyer never refers to the presumption of
innocence of a pre-trial detainee as having any bearing on the search
involved.121
Neither in its purpose nor in the application of the principle by the
Supreme Court is there a basis for the argument that the presumption of
innocence has any bearing on the legality of the taking and the using of
DNA samples from detained pre-trial arrestees.122
V. THE BALANCING TEST FOR REASONABLENESS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
A. Extent of Intrusion
The Supreme Court has long regarded reasonableness as the
In assessing the
“touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.”123
reasonableness of any governmental intrusion conducted without
individualized suspicion that falls within the parameters of the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has balanced the extent of the intrusion
against the government’s need to conduct the search or seizure
involved.124 Part V examines the extent of the intrusion that occurs when
an arrestee in a custodial facility is subjected to the taking of a DNA
118
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510,
1513 (2012) (deciding the issue of whether every detainee who will be admitted to the
general population may be required to undergo a visual inspection while undressed); infra
Part V.A (discussing the balancing test of reasonableness in greater detail).
119
See Florence, 132 S. Ct at 1523 (holding that the government struck a reasonable
balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institution).
120
See id. at 1528 (reasoning that there are strong justifications on both sides of the
argument).
121
See id. (illustrating the omission).
122
King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 582 (Md. 2012) (Barbera, J., dissenting)
(providing the majority’s stance on King’s privacy interest).
123
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250
(1991)); see also Shane Crotty, Note, The Aerial Dragnet: A Drone-ing Need for Fourth
Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L REV. 219, 221 (2014) (“The Amendment codified the sacred
common law right to be secure in one’s own person, free from arbitrary and oppressive
government intrusion.”).
124
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
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sample that is then compared with DNA samples found at crime
This examination is based on the factors previously
scenes.125
enumerated by the Supreme Court that bear on the extent of a Fourth
Amendment intrusion and are relevant to the acquisition and use of
DNA samples of arrestees.126 These factors include the degree of
physical intrusion, the uses to which evidence is put by the government
and others, and whether there are safeguards in place to insure that the
search or seizure is not conducted arbitrarily.127 Additionally, courts
have long regarded whether the subject of the search or seizure has a
diminished expectation of privacy as a significant factor in assessing the
extent of government intrusions.128 This examination demonstrates the
taking and use of DNA from arrestees is a relatively minor intrusion that
complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment when the
testing is conducted and limited in a manner consistent with previously
enumerated values of that amendment.
1.

Physical Intrusion

Several courts have described the physical intrusion involved in
obtaining a DNA sample as minimal.129 While it requires entry into the
body of the subject, the actual process involves contact that is brief,
painless, and absent any level of real embarrassment.130 As the
Maryland court in King II described it, the general method for obtaining
See infra Part V (discussing the extent of extrusion).
See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–71 (2009) (discussing the
factors); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761–62 (1985) (providing the factors for
reasonableness); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771–72 (1966) (relaying the factors).
127
See infra Part V.A.1 (analyzing the extent of the physical intrusion); see also infra Part
V.A.3 (examining non-arbitrariness).
128
Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013); State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1,
9 (Minn. 2012); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d. 387, 407 (3rd Cir. 2011); State v. Ritter,
956 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Vt. 2008); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2006); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273,
1280 (11th Cir. 2005).
129
See, e.g., King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1977 (demonstrating the intrusion of a cheek swab is a
minimal one); Johnson, 813 N.W.2d at 9 (conveying that a buccal swab inside the cheek to
acquire a DNA sample is a minimal intrusion); Mitchell, 652 F.3d. at 407 (providing that the
act of collecting DNA is minimal); State v. Ritter, 956 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Vt. 2008) (indicating
DNA sample taken by buccal swab is a minimal intrusion); Banks, 490 F.3d at 1189
(showing blood and saliva tests impose minimal intrusions); Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924
(illustrating that obtaining DNA sample involves minimal intrusion); Padgett, 401 F.3d at
1280 (stating that taking prisoners’ saliva samples involves a minor intrusion).
130
In approving the drug and alcohol testing of those railway personnel involved in
certain accidents, the Court noted the significance of the fact that such testing was
conducted “outside a hospital environment and with a minimum of inconvenience or
embarrassment.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989).
125
126
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the DNA sample is for “the collector to swab up-and-down and rotate a
sterile cotton swab on the interior of the cheek in the subject’s mouth,
with enough pressure to remove cells[; the] process is repeated on the
other cheek with a separate cotton swab.”131 When the Supreme Court
approved the more intrusive procedure of removing blood through
piercing the skin with a hypodermic needle, albeit with probable cause,
in Schmerber v. California, it noted that “for most people the procedure
involves virtually no risk, trauma[,] or pain.”132 When the Court
prohibited a bullet removal surgery sought in Winston v. Lee, it described
the physical intrusion from the surgery as “severe.”133 Similarly, in
Safford Unified School District Number 1 v. Redding, the Court determined
that the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment was violated by
the strip search of a thirteen-year-old middle school student based on the
articulable suspicion that she possessed a prohibited pain pill, and the
Court held this way because the intrusion was “embarrassing,
frightening and humiliating.”134 When applying the emerging factors
from Schmerber, Lee, and Safford to assess the degree of physical intrusion,
it is obvious that taking a swab from the interior cheek, the method used
often with arrestees and the one used in King II, is far less of a physical
intrusion than the taking of blood, surgery to remove bullets, or strip
searching a middle school student.135 Obtaining DNA samples involves
no “risk, trauma[,] or pain.”136 While there is some entry into the body
when taking a DNA swab from an inner cheek, there is no piercing of
skin as when a blood sample is taken.137 As one judge put it in
comparing the physical nature of the intrusion involved in the taking of
blood with that of buccal swabbing for DNA:
If the subcutaneous removal of blood from a person's
veins presents only a marginal intrusion into that
person's privacy interest, a fortiori the insertion of a
cotton swab into a person's mouth is less of an intrusion
and fairly characterized as de minimis. Unlike the
process of drawing blood, performing a buccal swab

King v. Maryland, 42 A.3d 549, 553 n.5 (Md. 2012).
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
133
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
134
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–75 (2009).
135
Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2013); United States v. Mitchell, 652
F.3d. 387, 407 (3rd Cir. 2011).
136
See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (wherein the Court referred to these factors as significant
in determining the reasonableness of the intrusion involved).
137
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (noting that buccal swab is a far more gentle process); see
also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625 (comparing breathalizer tests to blood tests).
131
132
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does not require skin to be pierced, or a hard, foreign
object to be situated inside of the body.138
This is not to say that the Court’s holdings in Schmerber, Lee, and Safford
control the Fourth Amendment acceptability of obtaining DNA samples
from arrestees.
The Fourth Amendment intrusion in the taking of DNA samples
from arrestees is not predicated on the probable cause that was present
in Schmerber and Lee or the reasonable suspicion existing in Safford, but
all are instructive regarding the factors that determine the extent of a
physical intrusion for purposes of deciding their reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment.139
Other factors identified by the Court for assessing the overall
reasonableness of a bodily intrusion are additional evidence that DNA
swabbing is an acceptable practice for Fourth Amendment purposes.140
In Schmerber, the Court observed that the intrusion was reasonable in
part because the test was effective at showing the amount of alcohol in
the arrestee’s blood.141 Similarly, the ability to identify someone by
comparing samples found at a crime scene to those known to belong to a
certain individual is now widely accepted by courts.142 Another factor
used to assess the reasonableness of an intrusion for Fourth Amendment
purposes is the uncertainty of the risk involved in obtaining evidence.143
The Court in Lee noted how this uncertainty regarding surgery to
remove bullets from the body reduced the reasonableness of the
intrusion.144 There is of course no such risk in the taking of DNA swabs

King v. Maryland (King II), 42 A.3d 549, 583 (Md. 2012) (Barbera, J., dissenting).
Commentators have noted the relative non-intrusive nature of swabbing the cheek for
DNA samples. See, e.g., Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to
Familial DNA Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 152 (2009) (describing
buccal swabbing as “perhaps the least intrusive of all seizures”); see also Amy H. Walker,
Collection of Genomic DNA by Buccal Swabs for Polymerase Chain Reaction-Based on Biomarker
Assays, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 517, 520 (1999) (discussing benefits of buccal swab
tests and steps for optimizing PCR success).
140
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980.
141
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
142
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (“The DNA collected from arrestees is an irrefutable
identification of the person from whom it was taken.”); see also Dist. Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009) (discussing DNA’s power to prove innocence); Diggs v.
State, 73 A.3d 306, 318 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (exploring the ability to match DNA to a
suspect with near certainty).
143
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 (1985) (elaborating on the element of uncertainty).
144
After examining in detail the risk of harm to the defendant of the bullet removal
surgery in question, the Court concluded that, “the very uncertainty militates against
finding the operation to be ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 766.
138
139
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from the cheeks of arrestees.145 Finally, when the Court approved the
suspicionless drug testing in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Association, it noted that the procedure for obtaining the urine samples
there may be performed safely outside a hospital environment.146 This is
true as well for the use of buccal swabs in obtaining DNA samples from
arrestees.147
2.

Uses of DNA Evidence

In addition to the nature of the physical act involved when the
government conducts a search or seizure, the extent of the overall
intrusion on one’s privacy is affected as well by the uses to which that
evidence is put.148 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court examined
the reasonableness of drug testing involving a physical intrusion similar
to the type it had found reasonable in previous cases.149 The Court
regarded the drug testing in Ferguson as a greater intrusion than in the
previous cases because in those cases, “there was no misunderstanding
about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the test results, and
there were protections against the dissemination of the results to third
parties.”150
Statutes that permit the DNA testing of arrestees should be limited
in their uses.151 The subjects should be notified of the purposes of the
test and, most importantly, the DNA should not be used for purposes
that go beyond identifying the subject and comparing the sample taken
from the arrestee to DNA samples found at the scenes of serious
crimes.152 The Maryland statute at issue in King I limits the use of DNA
samples taken from arrestees to the “identification” of the subject.153
145
See, e.g., Walker, supra note 139, at 520 (describing buccal swabbing as a relatively
noninvasive means of obtaining DNA “that pose[s] lowered risk for both the subject and
laboratory personnel”).
146
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
147
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968.
148
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).
149
Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001). The Court looked at the drug testing it
had found reasonable in Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634. Compare Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 665 (1995), and Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989),
with Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (illustrating circumstances where the
Supreme Court had found the testing unreasonable).
150
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
151
See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (2003) (limiting the use of DNA
records); id. § 2-505(b)(2) (providing restrictions on the use of DNA samples).
152
Id. § 2-505.
153
Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013). “Only DNA records that
directly relate to the identification of individuals shall be collected and stored.” MD. CODE
ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1).
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This includes the use of the DNA sample for comparative purposes but
forbids any other use.154 In fact, the statute provides for criminal
sanctions for anyone improperly using the samples or disseminating
them to third parties.155 Additionally, the Maryland statute prohibits the
kind of testing that would reveal intimate details about the subject.156 As
the judge who dissented to the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in
King II noted, the statute there “effectively restricts the testing of DNA to
the [thirteen] loci specified by the FBI and CODIS[,] . . . [t]hese specific
codi are non-coding; ‘in other words, the genetic material at these
locations is not known to determine a human attribute such as height,
weight, or susceptibility to a particular disease.’”157 In sum, this means
the loci involved in such testing, sometimes called “junk DNA,” “cannot
reveal any genetic information about an arrestee, other than that the
arrestee is identifiably different from other members of the human
race.”158
In distinguishing DNA testing from the use of fingerprints, the state
court majority opinion in King II noted that broad DNA testing, unlike
fingerprints, could reveal intimate details about an individual, what is
referred to as a “genetic treasure map.”159 This is certainly true,
however, given the restrictions in the Maryland statute and the
impossibility of revealing such details except by violating the law—it
seems the Maryland court was overly concerned with possible future
misuse of the samples.160 As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit wrote in United States v. Pool:
But beyond the fact that the DNA Act itself provides
protections against such misuse, our job is limited to
resolving the constitutionality of the program before us,
as it is designed and as it has been implemented. In our

MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-505(a)(2) & (b)(2).
“A person who violates subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section is guilty of a
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding [five] years or a
fine not exceeding [$5000] or both.” Id. § 2-512(e). “A person who violates subsection (d)
of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not
exceeding [one] year or a fine not exceeding [$1000].” Id. § 2-512(f).
156
“All personal identifiers shall be removed before information is entered into the
population data base.” Id. § 2-509(b).
157
King v. Maryland (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 584 (Md. 2012).
158
Id. at 585; see H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (“[G]enetic markers used for
forensic DNA testing were purposely selected because they are not associated with any
known physical or medical characteristics.”); see also CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note
52 (discussing the type of information stored in CODIS DNA databases).
159
King I, 42 A.3d at 577; United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1238 (9th Cir. 2010).
160
See King I, 42 A.3d at 578 (finding DNA to encompass a heightened security threat).
154
155
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system of government, courts base decisions not on
dramatic Hollywood fantasies, . . . but on concretely
particularized facts developed in the cauldron of the
adversary process and reduced to an assessable record.
If, . . . and when, some future program permits the
parade of horribles the DNA Act’s opponents fear—
unregulated disclosure of CODIS profiles to private
parties,
genetic
discrimination,
state-sponsored
eugenics . . .—we have every confidence that courts will
respond appropriately.161
The possibility of overreaching can never be eliminated, but it is
unreasonable to negate an otherwise acceptable government activity
when both science and law substantially limit that possibility.162
Courts have universally permitted DNA testing of convicted
criminals where this same slim possibility of misuse exists.163 Even
accepting the proposition that the expectation of privacy for one
convicted of a crime is less than one arrested, but still presumed to be
innocent, it is difficult to see why this difference would allow DNA
testing of convicts if there was a serious risk that such testing could
reveal the “genetic treasure map” alluded to above.164 It is crucial
therefore to limit the use of the DNA samples taken from arrestees in a
manner similar to the way this is accomplished under the Maryland
statute.165 This includes a limit on the kind of genetic material tested and
severe penalties for anyone who reveals any information from the testing
that is not authorized by the statute.166
3.

Non-arbitrariness

The Supreme Court long ago established the principle that for
intrusions into areas protected by the Fourth Amendment that take place
without individualized suspicion, the reasonableness of such intrusions
depends to a significant degree on the amount of discretion that
individual government officials have in executing the searches or

161
Pool, 621 F.3d at 1221–22 (quoting United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837–38 (9th
Cir. 2004)).
162
Id. at 1238.
163
See supra notes 148–58 and accompanying text (discussing the law surrounding DNA
collection).
164
King I, 42 A.3d at 577.
165
See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505(b)(1) (2011) (limiting DNA searches to only
identification purposes).
166
Id. § 2-512(e).
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seizures in question.167 The more discretion a search or seizure involves,
the more intrusive it is, and this enhanced intrusiveness weighs against
the reasonableness of the procedure for Fourth Amendment purposes.168
Although the objective physical intrusion of two procedures may be
similar, the fact that one allows the police greater discretion regarding
whom to search increases the anxiety of the individual and therefore the
subjective degree of the intrusion.169
Searches or seizures conducted without individualized suspicion at
the discretion of officers in the field can be arbitrary or discriminatory,
and a search that is either of these would conflict with Fourth
Amendment principles.170 In contrast, the regularity of a government
search or seizure avoids the kind of randomness and arbitrariness
against which the Fourth Amendment is designed to protect.171 For
example, in assessing the constitutionality of border area automobile
seizures designed to detect smugglers of undocumented aliens that were
conducted without individualized suspicion, the Court allowed them
when done at a checkpoint stopping all cars but not when done by
officers in the field making individual decisions about which cars to
stop.172 In permitting the inspection of automobile parts dealerships
without individualized suspicion, one of the criteria used by the Court in
determining the reasonableness of such inspections was the systematized

167
See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (“warrantless searches devolves
almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers”); see also United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (demonstrating that warrantless searches must be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397
U.S. 72, 74 (1970) (conveying that warrantless searches are permitted under certain
circumstances).
168
Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312.
169
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557–58 (1976).
170
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (affirming the importance of imposing limitations on government
officials).
171
Marshall, 436 U.S. at 314.
172
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273
(1973); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653–54. The Supreme Court prohibited the suspicionless stops of
individual cars to check for drivers licenses and registration, and the Court stated, “[t]he
essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law
enforcement agents, in order ‘to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions.’” Id.; see Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882 (limiting police discretion in
patrol stops). Similarly, when it approved the use of sobriety checkpoints to apprehend
and deter intoxicated drivers, the Court noted the reduced level of the subjective intrusion
resulting from the fact that in stopping all the cars that approached the checkpoints, the
police exercised no discretion. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452–53
(1990).
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nature of the inspection scheme and how it largely removed discretion
from those conducting the inspections.173
Particularly noteworthy regarding the significance of discretion in
searches or seizures of individuals performed without individualized
suspicion is the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Samson v.
California and the manner in which the majority opinion responded to
it.174 Justice Stevens criticized the decision in Samson, which allowed
police unlimited discretion to search parolees without any
individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.175 He asserted that
previous Supreme Court decisions have dispensed with individualized
suspicion in special needs cases where “programmatic safeguards [are]
designed to ensure evenhandedness in application,” and that “if
individualized suspicion is to be jettisoned, it must be replaced with
measures to protect against the state actor’s unfettered discretion.”176
Justice Stevens argued that the California statute at issue contained no
such limiting policies “to rein in officers and furnish a bulwark against
the arbitrary exercise of discretion that is the height of
unreasonableness.”177 The response to Justice Stevens’ argument from
the majority disputed his claim that the statute allowed for unbridled
discretion because of California case law and statutory prohibitions that
generally disallow arbitrary and capricious searches.178 Dubious as the
majority’s response here might be, it is noteworthy that the Court did not
dispute Stevens’ assertion that were these intrusions too discretionary,
they would be unreasonable.179
Regardless of whether one accepts Samson’s majority view that
discretion was effectively limited in a search, notwithstanding the fact
that virtually any parolees could be searched and seized without
The Supreme Court wrote:
The statute’s inspection program in terms of the certainty and
regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant. In other words, the regulatory
statute must perform the two basic function of a warrant: it must
advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being
made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it
must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987).
174
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 859 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 860.
177
Id. at 860–61.
178
Id. at 856.
179
“The concern that California’s suspicionless search system gives officers unbridled
discretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that arouse strong
resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate into productive society, is
belied by California’s prohibition on ‘arbitrary, capricious or harassing’ searches.” Id.
173
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individualized suspicion under California’s enabling statute, the contrast
with DNA testing of arrestees under an appropriately limiting law, such
as that in Maryland, is stark.180 The Maryland statute requires that
everyone arrested for certain crimes and in police custody must have a
DNA sample obtained in the same manner and put to the same uses as
all others in the same group.181 Virtually no discretion or arbitrariness is
permitted regarding the nature of the intrusion here, and thus on this
issue, the search and seizure under the Maryland DNA statute is far less
intrusive than the search approved by the Court in Samson.182 It is hardly
surprising then that the King II Court found that the relatively discretionfree nature of the Maryland DNA testing procedure weighed heavily in
determining its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.183
The extent of the intrusion is one of two integral parts of the
balancing test used to determine the reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment of personal searches and seizures conducted without
individualized suspicion.184 The obtaining and use of DNA samples
taken from arrestees detained in custodial facilities, when authorized
under protective statutes such as the one at issue in King II, is a relatively
minor intrusion under the standards applied by the Supreme Court.185
The process of the sample taking involves a safe, brief, non-harmful, and
minimally intrusive physical act.186 The taking is conducted in a
standardized non-arbitrary manner and is risk-free.187 Finally, when
strong protections against improper use and dissemination of the results
of the testing are included within the authorizing statute, the extent of
the intrusion is even more minimal.188
B. Nature of Government Interest
The next step in the balancing process then is to assess the extent of
the government interest in taking and testing DNA samples of

Maryland v. King (King I), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013). See generally Samson, 547 U.S. at
856 (providing the Court’s holding).
181
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (2011).
182
Compare King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1964 (concluding that an intrusion of a cheek swab to
obtain a DNA sample is minimal), with Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (confirming that
suspicionless search of parolee does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
183
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622
(1989)).
184
Id. at 1977.
185
Id. at 1980; see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (allotting reduced protection
to those in custody).
186
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1964.
187
Id. at 1970.
188
Id. at 1967.
180
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arrestees.189 DNA evidence when obtained and tested through accepted
means is very reliable.190 It can establish to a near mathematical certainty
that someone was present at a certain location or at some point
possessed a certain object.191 Crime solving techniques of far less
reliability are used by police in solving crimes and permitted by courts in
adjudicating them.192 Evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, attests to
the importance of DNA evidence in helping to convict those guilty of
serious crimes and exonerate those who are innocent.193 No more
important purpose exists for the use of evidence or for that matter for
our system of criminal justice.
DNA evidence has been used to help apprehend those guilty of
recent crimes and to solve cold cases, often thought to be insolvable.194
DNA samples were often times not available from the scenes of past
serious crimes.195 Now it is standard procedure in many police
departments to seek DNA samples from the scenes of serious crimes just
as looking for fingerprints or other physical evidence is part of crime

See id. at 1962 (discussing government interest).
See Julie E. Samuels et al., Collecting DNA at Arrest: Policies, Practices, and Implications,
URBAN INST. (May 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412831Collecting-DNA-at-Arrest-Policies-Practices-and-Implications-Report.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/BJ2V-2DHH (providing a background of DNA collections and policies
regarding arrests).
191
Id.
192
See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 13, 63 (2001) (comparing fingerprint evidence to DNA evidence).
193
See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php, archived
at http://perma.cc/GU76-CNE2 (discussing DNA exonerations for people wrongfully
convicted of crimes); CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 52 (discussing the CODIS and
NDIS facts). In assessing the manner in which criminal investigations are aided by the use
of DNA comparisons, the FBI reports that the National DNA Index (“NDIS”) contains over
11,015,147 offender profiles, 1,922,415 arrestee profiles, and 565,159 forensic profiles as of
June 2014. Id. Ultimately, the success of the CODIS program will be measured by the
crimes it helps to solve. Id. CODIS’s primary metric, the “Investigation Aided,” tracks the
number of criminal investigations where CODIS has added value to the investigative
process. Id. As of June 2014, CODIS has produced over 250,809 hits assisting in more than
239,317 investigations. Id.
194
See infra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing how DNA evidence has helped
exonerate wrongfully convicted individuals).
195
See Non-DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/non-dna-exonerations.php,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/L564-V8P8 (discussing how individuals have been exonerated by other
means besides DNA evidence).
189
190
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scene investigation.196 We can, therefore, expect that many more crimes
than in the past may be solved through the use of DNA evidence.197
Collecting DNA from arrestees expands the number of people whose
samples can be compared to those found at crime scenes and should
increase the number of crimes solved through DNA hits.198 If the extent
of intrusion to the individual arrested for a serious felony is minor, as
discussed above, this important government interest satisfies the test for
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and should be
permitted.199
There are many accounts of DNA evidence being used to link people
to awful crimes.200 For example, DNA testing was used to identify and
eventually convict the infamous “Green River Killer” who raped and
murdered dozens of women in the Seattle-Tacoma area in the 1980s and
1990s.201 In 2001, forensic investigators decided to re-examine evidence
compiled years before with two new modes of DNA analysis and found
that a sample of semen left on a victim matched Gary Ridgway’s DNA.202
Confronted with the weight of this evidence, Ridgeway pled guilty and
was sentenced to forty-eight consecutive life sentences with no
possibility of parole.203

See Samuels, supra note 190 (discussing the DNA collection practice at arrests).
See Jay Siegel & Susan D. Narveson, Why Arrestee DNA Legislation Can Save Indiana
Taxpayers over $60 Million Per Year (Jan. 2009), available at http://dnasaves.org/files/
IN_DNA_Cost_Savings_Study.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5VPM-KSCQ (discussing
an anticipated increase in solved crimes).
198
Id.
199
See supra Part V.A (discussing the extent of intrusion of DNA testing).
200
See Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA to Solve Crimes, U.S. DEP’T
JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/advancing-justice-throughdna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes, archived at http://perma.cc/MG7M-EQE9 (“In
1999, New York authorities linked a man through DNA evidence to at least [twenty-two]
sexual assaults and robberies that had terrorized the city. In 2002, authorities in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Fort Collins, Colorado, used DNA evidence to link and
solve a series of crimes (rapes and a murder) perpetrated by the same individual.”); P.
Solomon Banda, Police Use DNA to Solve Property Crimes, NBC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27284393/ns/technology_and_science-science
/t/police-use-dna-solve-property-crimes/#.U9pyAo1dU7p, archived at http://perma.cc/
Y2YG-8UN4 (“RazJohn Smyer, a suspect in a string of Denver-area break-ins, often
checked his victims' refrigerators and helped himself to a drink. The soda cans he left
behind gave police enough DNA evidence to link him to five burglaries. He's now serving
a [twenty]-year sentence.”).
201
See Elizabeth Svoboda, Cold Case is Closed by DNA Match: Green River Killer, N.Y.
TIMES (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/science/12filedna.html?_&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/5MSZ-ULV5 (discussing the “Green River”
killer’s capture).
202
Id.
203
Id.
196
197
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Of additional significance are those cases in which DNA evidence
not only links individuals to crimes but where it also exonerates those
who have been charged or convicted of those crimes.204 For nearly thirty
years, Erie County, New York, was terrorized by a man who came to be
known as the “Bike Path Rapist.”205 Anthony Capozzi, the man who was
believed to be responsible for the rapes and murder of three women
committed by the Bike Path Rapist, was convicted in 1984 of two of the
rapes based on eyewitness identification and sentenced to twenty–five
years in prison.206 However, while Capozzi was in prison, additional
rapes and murders took place.207 Those murders were incredibly similar
to prior rapes and murders, including the two for which Capozzi was
incarcerated.208 The final murder took place on a local bike path in 2006
and a task force was formed to investigate the crime.209 Ultimately,
Altemio Sanchez’s DNA was collected from a water glass in a restaurant
and found to match the DNA profile from a drop of sweat found in the
last victim’s car.210 While all the evidence from Capozzi’s trial had been
destroyed after his appeal was denied, forensic DNA tests of the clinical
slides still maintained at the hospital of the two victims for which
Capozzi had been convicted matched the DNA profile of Altemio
Sanchez.211 Using DNA, prosecutors linked Sanchez to at least eight
other attacks, including the two for which Capozzi was convicted.212 In
2007, after serving twenty–two years in prison, Capozzi was exonerated
and Sanchez pled guilty to the murder of three women.213
In addition to the Capozzi case, the Innocence Project lists 321 cases
where DNA evidence was instrumental in showing wrongful
convictions.214 Twenty of those cases involved people who were on
death row.215 In Maryland, the state from where the King II case

See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204 (demonstrating the amount of
individuals exonerated by DNA evidence).
205
Carolyn Thompson, Buffalo’s Bike Path Rapist Sentenced, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2007,
12:11 AM), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
08/14/AR2007081400904.html, archived at http://perma.cc/A3HB-2ST8.
206
DNA
Case
Highlights,
N.Y.
STATE
DIV.
CRIM.
JUSTICE
SERVS.,
http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/dnacasehighlights.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/39B-L8J5.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Thompson, supra note 205.
213
Id.
214
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204.
215
Id.
204
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emanates, the most famous case is that of Kirk Bloodsworth.216
Bloodsworth was convicted of the rape and murder of a nine-year-old
girl in a brutal 1984 crime.217 He was convicted based on an identosketch, which looked like him, and the testimony of five eyewitnesses
claiming to have seen Bloodsworth with the victim.218 It was the
discovery and comparison of DNA found on the clothing of the victim
that ultimately exonerated Bloodsworth and pointed to the man who
had actually raped and murdered Dawn Hamilton.219 Until DNA
evidence freed him, Kirk Bloodsworth served more than eight years in
prison, two on death row, for a crime he did not commit.220
One of the most notorious wrongful convictions occurred in what
became known as the Central Park Jogger Case.221 Based in part on the
confessions of some of them, five men were convicted of raping a
woman as she jogged through New York’s Central Park.222 Only after
some of the men served more than a decade in prison did another man
confess to the crime.223 It was, however, the fact that his DNA matched
that of the semen found in the victim that made absolutely clear that
those serving time for the crime had to be released.224 DNA evidence is
crucial in such a case because many are unwilling to exculpate someone
convicted of a crime based on the word of another criminal.225 Nothing

See Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/casesfalse-imprisonment/kirk-bloodsworth (last visited Apr. 16, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/Q7BD-W5H2 (providing information regarding Kirk Bloodsworth and
his 1985 conviction).
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
See id. (establishing Bloodsworth’s innocence and exoneration based on DNA).
220
Id.
221
See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in the ’89 Central Park Jogger
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/20/
nyregion/convictions-and-charges-voided-in-89-central-park-jogger-attack.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/L8KU-U3QX (attributing the exoneration of five young men in a savage
beating to DNA evidence).
222
Id.
223
See id. (explaining that another man, Matias Reyes, confessed to raping the New York
woman).
224
See Robert D. McFadden, Boys’ Guilt Likely in Rape of Jogger, Police Panel Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://condemnationofblackness.voices.wooster.edu/
files/2013/10/BOYS-GUILT-LIKELY-IN-RAPE-OF-JOGGER-POLICE-PANEL-SAYS-NewYork-Times.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8HFL-5RV4 (establishing DNA as the reason
the convicted man had to be released). Michael Armstrong, one of the authors of a NYC
Police Department report on the case, said “the panel did not dispute the legal necessity of
setting aside the convictions of the five defendants based on the new DNA evidence that
Mr. Reyes had raped the jogger.” Id.
225
Id. (quoting Armstrong, “we think the word of a serial rapist killer is not something to
be heavily relied upon”).
216
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contaminates the criminal justice system more than when innocent
people are convicted of crimes.226 The ability of DNA evidence to
exonerate such people has been demonstrated and is an integral
component of the government’s interest in expanding their DNA sample
list with the specimens of those arrested and incarcerated for serious
crimes.227 The Capozzi, Bloodsworth and Central Park Jogger cases
show how identification testimony and confessions, two types of
evidence that lead to lots of convictions, can be incorrect and that such
mistakes can result in tragic consequences.228 It is hard to imagine the
injustices that would result in these cases had they not been corrected
with DNA evidence.229
For the government interest to be substantial regarding the taking of
DNA samples from those arrested for serious crimes, there must be a
specific benefit derived from obtaining the samples upon arrest and not
depending on a conviction before doing so.230 Studies indicate that such
a benefit is in fact present.231 This benefit accrues both through
apprehending the actual perpetrators of past violent crimes and, in
doing so, preventing future crimes by imprisoning the individuals before
they can re-offend.232 For example, a Virginia study found that between
226
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating the goal of the criminal
justice system is to see “that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer”). What is famously
known as Blackstone’s formulation makes the same point differently, “[i]t is better that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” Words of Justice, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR.,
http://library.law.harvard.edu/justicequotes/explore-the-room/south-4/ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4RXE-Z4QL.
227
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204.
228
See Bloodsworth, supra note 216 (illustrating that Bloodsworth spent years on death row
for a crime he did not commit).
229
See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204 (conveying the success of DNA in
exonerating those wrongfully convicted).
230
See infra Part VII (elaborating on the primary purpose test).
231
Arrestees, DNA FORENSICS, http://www.dnaforensics.com/Arrestees.aspx (last visited
Mar. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SD5D-YXY7; Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra
note 190; DENVER’S STUDY ON PREVENTABLE CRIMES, DENV. DIST. ATT’YS OFF., available at
http://www.denverda.org/DNA_Documents/Arrestee_Database/Denver%20Preventable
%20Crime%20Study1.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4Z4689NG; Maryland Study on Preventable Crimes, MD. CRIM. JUSTICE INFO. SYS., available at
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/MarylandDNAarresteestudy.pdf (last visited
Mar. 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4GTL-N5NM.
232
In its assessment of DNA testing of arrestees, the Urban Institute reported that:
Research demonstrates that a considerable number of individuals will
commit multiple crimes, suggesting that collecting DNA from repeat
offenders could assist law enforcement in solving crimes. Proponents
of arrestee DNA laws recognize that certain individuals who are
arrested but not convicted for a qualifying offense have committed
crimes (or will commit future crimes) for which there might be forensic
evidence. Even those who are ultimately convicted may remain in the
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2003 and 2009, the DNA testing of arrestees resulted in 559 “hits,”
eighty-nine of which were associated with sexual offense cases.233 A
Maryland study of just three offenders concluded that had their DNA
been obtained upon their arrest for a serious crime, twenty crimes could
have been prevented.234 The DNA sampling of arrestees obtained under
the Maryland law at issue in King II from 2009 through 2013 resulted in
303 “hits,” ninety-three arrests, and sixty-one convictions.235 A study
done by the District Attorney’s Office in Denver concluded that had the
DNA of just five people arrested for felonies been taken upon their
arrest, forty–seven violent crimes, including three murders and eighteen
sexual assaults, could have been prevented.236
There are many reasons why arrests do not lead to convictions, some
related to whether the individual actually committed the crime for which
he has been arrested and many that do not.237 If the use of DNA
comparisons were limited to only those convicted of crimes, a critically
important investigative tool might be delayed or lost entirely.238 For
those who have not been convicted after arrest, statutes, such as the
Maryland one at issue in the King II case, appropriately require

community between their arrest and conviction, which could provide
an opportunity for additional criminal offending before DNA can be
collected, analyzed, and used to establish guilt. The expansion of
offender databases to include arrestees seeks to remedy this gap by
identifying new suspects in a criminal investigation and resolving
cases faster. Proponents of arrestee DNA frequently cite averted crime
as a short- and long-term outcome. Based on findings from their costbenefit analysis of proposed arrestee DNA legislation in Indiana,
Siegel and Narveson (2009) concluded, “with an arrestee law in place,
the first time [a criminal] is arrested he will be linked to his long record
of anonymous violent crimes, and can be removed from the population
and the opportunity to do further harm—saving the government’s cost
to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate those prevented crimes.” In
their retrospective case studies exploring the criminal trajectories of
known criminals, several jurisdictions have arrived at the same
conclusion as Siegel and Narveson, arguing that if DNA had been
collected earlier in the individuals’ criminal careers, crimes may have
been prevented.
Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra note 190, at 7.
233
Arrestees, supra note 231.
234
Maryland Study on Preventable Crimes, supra note 231.
235
See Arrestees, supra note 231 (showing the total number of “hits”, arrests, and
convictions between 2009 and 2013 for charged offenders).
236
DENVER’S STUDY ON PREVENTABLE CRIMES, supra note 231.
237
See Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra note 190, at iii (discussing how many arrests do not
lead to convictions).
238
See supra note 204 (addressing the results of several studies, which indicate the
significance of a DNA database in exonerations).
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expungement of those samples.239 Therefore, with regard to those who
have been arrested for serious crimes but not subsequently convicted,
their DNA is on file only for the time between arrest and disposition of
their case.240 Assuming again that the sample is used only to identify the
arrestee and to see if he has been involved in other serious crimes, the
intrusion to his privacy rights would seem minimal compared to the
government’s need to successfully investigate and solve those crimes,
particularly if others have been wrongfully charged with or convicted of
those crimes.241 This is especially true when considering how the success
of criminal investigations can be compromised by delays in obtaining
crucial evidence.242
VI. DIMINISHED EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
The previous section of this Article analyzed the extent of the
intrusion involved when the government obtains a DNA sample from a
buccal swab taken from an arrestee in a custodial institution.243 This
intrusion also includes the uses to which a sample is put, specifically to
confirm the identity of the subject and to link the subject to serious
crimes.244 In assessing the degree to which such an intrusion factors into
the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment, courts must also take into consideration whether the
subject of the intrusion has a diminished expectation of privacy.245 Such
a diminished expectation allows for government searches and seizures
that might not otherwise be considered reasonable under the Fourth

See MD. PUB. SAFETY § 2-504 (2011) (explaining that DNA samples may be destroyed if
the individual is not convicted after arrest).
240
See Collecting DNA at Arrest, supra note 190, at 1 (stating that DNA specimens are
collected from an individual following an arrest but before case disposition).
241
See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 204 (illustrating exonerations of those
wrongfully convicted).
242
See Nathan James, DNA Testing in Criminal Justice: Background, Current Law, Grants,
and Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 8 (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R41800.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AJT7-FAS2 (discussing the problems
with delays in DNA processing).
243
See supra Part V (discussing in depth the reasonableness test).
244
See supra note 2 (discussing various federal and state crimes that require the collection
of a DNA sample).
245
See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013) (explaining that the
reasonableness of any search must be considered in the context of that individual’s
legitimate expectations of privacy); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
654 (1995) (expressing that the nature of privacy interest is the first factor to be considered
when discussing Fourth Amendment protections); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715
(1987) (stating that an expectation of privacy infringed upon must be reasonable to
implicate the Fourth Amendment).
239
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Amendment.246 Specifically, if a person or business has a diminished
expectation of privacy, this plays a central role in permitting the
government to intrude upon areas and interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment without the usual requirements of individualized suspicion
and a warrant.247 It is incumbent then to examine whether, and to what
extent, arrestees confined to a total custodial facility have a diminished
expectation of privacy. This would then factor significantly into the
determination of whether DNA samples can be taken from them without
suspicion and used to determine if they were involved with any other
crime.
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions held that a person or
business with a diminished expectation of privacy is subject to certain
types of searches and seizures that would not be permitted absent this
diminished expectation.248 With businesses, this diminished expectation
comes from the fact that certain facilities, such as coal mines and firearm
dealerships, are pervasively regulated by the government. 249
See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (illustrating that search warrant
exceptions exist for businesses with a rich history of government oversight); see also United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (holding that warrantless inspections of firearm
businesses do not violate the Fourth Amendment); Colonnade Catering Corp v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (acknowledging that reasonableness is viewed differently
under the Fourth Amendment for areas where the government has broad inspection
powers).
247
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (explaining that a warrant and
probable cause requirements typically required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment
standards of reasonableness have a lessened application when there is a diminished
expectation of privacy); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (describing the importance of being able to conduct searches immediately in
certain situations, such as teaching in a public school, and that requiring evidence for
probable cause would not allow that immediate search); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315 (contrasting
the government interest in regulating the liquor industry and the firearm industry to assess
the expectation of privacy for licensed dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 75–77
(providing background on government regulation on the liquor industry and explaining
that the history of heavy government oversight causes a diminished expectation of privacy
and allows for warrantless inspections).
248
See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316 (justifying unannounced, warrantless inspections by
distinguishing business industries with diminished expectations of privacy); see also Burger,
482 U.S. at 702 (discussing the significance of “closely regulated” industries that create a
diminished expectation of privacy and serve as exceptions to the traditional warrant and
probable cause requirements); Marshall, 436 U.S. at 320 (revealing that entitlement to
inspection without prior notice can be based on reasonable legislature and administrative
standards for certain businesses).
249
See Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 (reasoning that business owners in “closely regulated”
industries have a diminished privacy expectation because the industries are pervasively
regulated by the government, and owners have knowledge that their business records and
other operating conditions may be inspected and heavily regulated); see also Biswell, 406
U.S. at 316 (demonstrating that an arms dealer knows his business records will be subject to
inspection when he decides to engage in the pervasively regulated field); Colonnade
246
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Accordingly, the owners of such businesses are on notice that their
premises are subject to government inspections without probable cause
or specific warrants.250 Regarding searches and seizures of individuals,
the Supreme Court has held that certain jobs or the overall status of some
people can result in their having a reduced privacy expectation
compared to the public at large.251 Probationers, parolees, certain high
school students, railroad workers involved in accidents, and federal
employees about to be transferred to positions where they will be
carrying firearms are among those that have been deemed to possess
such a diminished expectation of privacy.252
Some of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding which groups
have a diminished expectation of privacy are highly questionable.253 For
example, in justifying various types of searches of automobiles and
containers within automobiles, the Court relied on what it regarded as
the diminished expectation of privacy that one has in an automobile.254
This diminished expectation was said to be due in part to the fact that
regulations exist regarding the ownership, use, and maintenance of

Catering Corp., 397 U.S. at 77 (assessing the pervasiveness of regulations on the liquor
industry and holding that warrantless searches are permissible under the Fourth
Amendment).
250
See, e.g. Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 (stating that firearms dealers, and other business
owners, that choose to engage in the heavily regulated business, have knowledge that their
business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to inspection).
251
See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001) (asserting that probationers have
a diminished expectation of privacy); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006)
(comparing the privacy of a parolee to a probationer and holding that parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–32 (2002) (finding that a student’s privacy interest is limited in a
public school environment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985) (holding that
students still have some privacy interests and those interests are not waived completely by
simply carrying bags onto school grounds); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
628 (1989) (acknowledging that railroad workers have a diminished expectation of privacy
as it relates to toxicology testing after work accidents because of the dangerousness
associated with their occupation); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
672 (1989) (reasoning that federal employees required to carry firearms or work in the
interdiction of illegal drugs have a diminished expectation of privacy).
252
See infra notes 248–51 and accompanying text (discussing employees with a
diminished expectation of privacy).
253
See infra notes 254–56 and accompanying text (illustrating that those in automobiles
have a diminished expectation of privacy).
254
See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (reasoning that the amount of privacy
expected in an automobile is diminished). In Chambers v. Maroney, the Supreme Court
chronicled the development of car searches and seizures. 399 U.S. 42, 49 (1970). The
original justification for warrantless searches of vehicles based on probable cause was due
to the mobility of the automobile. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
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automobiles.255 Still it is difficult to see, as the Court has held, how
requiring the registration of automobiles and mandating certain types of
periodic vehicle inspections results in an individual having less of an
expectation of privacy in a paper bag locked in the trunk of her car than
when that same bag is being openly carried in the street.256 In
sanctioning the suspicionless drug testing of certain high school
students, the Court found a reduced expectation of privacy in the fact
that these students participated in extracurricular activities.257 Leaving
aside the fact that most high school students participate in one or more
such activities, it is difficult to understand why a fourteen-year-old
student who joins the chess club or debate society deserves less privacy
than other students.258 Additionally, it is even harder to imagine that
students participating in extracurricular activities are, or should be

255
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441–42 (1973) (relying on the fact that there are
many existing state and federal laws that govern the ownership and operation of
automobiles to rationalize the diminished expectation of privacy). In explaining those
regulations, the Court in Cady wrote, “[a]ll states require vehicles to be registered and
operators to be licensed. States and localities have enacted extensive and detailed codes
regulating the condition and manner in which motor vehicles may be operated on public
streets and highways.” Id. at 441. Automobiles periodically undergo official inspection,
and they are often taken into police custody in the interests of public safety. South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
256
This difficulty was the result of the Court’s holding in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 580–81 (1991), and led to Justice Stevens’ comment in his dissent that:
For surely it is anomalous to prohibit a search of a briefcase while the
owner is carrying it exposed on a public street yet to permit a search
once the owner has placed the briefcase in the locked trunk of his car.
One's privacy interest in one's luggage can certainly not be diminished
by one's removing it from a public thoroughfare and placing it-out of
sight-in a privately owned vehicle.
Id. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 195–96 (4th ed.
2000). The authors state:
The reasons the Court gave in Chadwick for distinguishing the privacy
interest associated with cars from that associated with other effects do
not explain why the areas in which evidence is usually found (e.g.
glove compartments, trunks and so on) are less protected than other
private areas which house personal property. More importantly, even
if the car and its interior do have a diminished aura of privacy, the fact
should not be relevant to whether a warrant is required.
Id.
257
See infra notes 283–307 and accompanying text (using Supreme Court cases regarding
subpopulations of high school students to illustrate the way one population can have
varying yet legitimate expectations of privacy).
258
See infra notes 283–309 and accompanying text (illustrating the differing expectations
of privacy through high school students).
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aware that, due to their status, they should expect less privacy from
government intrusions than other students.259
There are, however, other individuals who by virtue of their special
status deserve less privacy and should be aware they have less privacy
than other citizens.260 The Supreme Court has made clear that
probationers, parolees, and those in custodial facilities fall into this
category.261 In Morrrissey v. Brewer, the Court asserted that parolees “do
not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”262 In
United States v. Knights, the Court held that as a probationer, Knights,
had a “significantly diminished expectation of privacy,” and therefore a
search of his home was permissible with reasonable suspicion but
without probable cause or a warrant.263 In Samson v. California, the Court
dealt with the issue of whether parolees could be searched when the
government possessed neither reasonable suspicion nor a warrant.264 In
permitting such searches, the Court observed that because they enjoy
even less freedom than probationers, parolees have an expectation of
privacy that is reduced even more than that of probationers.265 The
Samson Court noted the restrictions on liberty that attend to parolees in
California and the state law declaring that a parolee is in the “legal
custody of the Department of Corrections.”266 The Court concluded that
due to such restrictions, parolees “have severely diminished expectations
of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”267
The holdings in Knights and Samson make clear that due to the
relative loss of liberty that probationers, and to a greater extent parolees,

259
This awareness element was described in Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., wherein the
Supreme Court distinguished between government inspections of businesses which are
pervasively or closely regulated, such as those that sell liquor or firearms, and others such
as Barlow’s plumbing and electrical installation businesses, regarding the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of such inspections. 436 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1978). This
distinction is based on the diminished expectation of the former because such businesses
are aware of the heightened government scrutiny of their operations, through such things
as periodic inspections, and in effect consent to them. Id. at 313.
260
See generally Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (incorporating parolees);
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117 (2001) (regarding probationers); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538–39 (1984) (addressing those in custody).
261
See infra notes 262–67 and accompanying text (discussing cases that highlight these
individuals).
262
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (quoted in Knights, 534 U.S. at 120).
263
Knights, 534 U.S. at 119–20.
264
Samson, 547 U.S. at 847.
265
See id. at 850 (explaining that parolees are only permitted to leave prison on parole if
they agree to follow severe restrictions imposed, and they are typically subjected to great
supervision while on parole).
266
Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
267
Id. at 852.
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experience, they are on a continuum regarding a diminished expectation
of privacy. This diminished expectation of privacy due to the relative
loss of liberty of a parolee played a large role in the Court’s decision that
Samson could be subjected to a full-blown search without the presence of
individualized suspicion.268 Still, even though freedom is restricted in
the ways described above, probationers and parolees go about their
everyday business largely free of government involvement and
control.269 Virtually none of the activity of one who has been arrested
and in a full custodial facility is similarly free of government
involvement and control.270 Therefore, it would seem beyond dispute
that an arrestee under the near total government control of a jail or
prison has even less of an expectation of privacy than that of a parolee.
Interestingly, the dissent of Justice Stevens in Samson makes a similar
point regarding an expectation of privacy.271 In articulating his
disagreement with the majority holding that Samson had no expectation
of privacy, Justice Stevens argues that there is a difference between the
status of a parolee or a probationer and that of a prisoner.272 “A parolee,
like a probationer, is set free in the world subject to restrictions intended
to facilitate supervision and guard against antisocial behavior.”273 One
who is arrested and confined to a total custody facility such as a jail or
prison has not been set free and therefore would seem again to have a
lower expectation of privacy than a parolee or probationer.274
Although they have not been convicted of crimes and are often not
usually confined in prisons designed to hold those already convicted,
arrestees in custodial facilities, such as jails, are deprived of their
freedoms in ways similar to those who are confined in prisons.275 In a
See id. (examining the totality of the circumstances involved in the case).
See id. at 861 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that parolees and probationers
are able to live freely under certain restrictions but with much less supervision and
restraints than those imposed in prison).
270
See Samson, 547 U.S. at 862 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984))
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (illustrating the differing expectations of privacy for parolees and
prisoners by acknowledging that prisoners traditionally held no right to privacy under the
Fourth Amendment because of the states’ need to implement institutional safeguards in all
prisons).
271
See id. at 861–64 (illustrating a lessened expectation of privacy for both prisoners and
parolees).
272
Id.
273
Id. at 861.
274
See generally id. (distinguishing those who are set free from those in custody).
275
See generally Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1511 (2012)
(holding that search procedures at county jails struck a reasonable balance between inmate
privacy and the needs of the institution); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 521 (1979) (finding
that maintaining security and preserving discipline are essential goals that may require
limitation of constitutional rights); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962) (holding
268
269
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series of cases, the Supreme Court has held that those detained in such
custodial institutions have significantly diminished expectations of
privacy.276 Perhaps the most definitive of those holdings was the Court’s
relatively recent decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the
County of Burlington.277 Florence was arrested and taken to a county
detention center for failing to appear at a hearing regarding a warrant,
which incorrectly alleged that he failed to pay a fine.278 Despite the
relatively minor nature of what he was arrested for, Florence was subject
to a full body search upon his entry into the county detention facility.279
The officers at the facility had Florence disrobe and then subjected him to
a search that included an inspection of the most private areas of his
body.280 They executed this search absent any suspicion that Florence
might have been carrying items that are prohibited in the facility.281 The
Court found the search here to be compliant with the Fourth
Amendment in part because the conditions and security needs of the
institution result in arrestees detained in custodial institutions having a
significantly reduced expectation of privacy.282
Some have characterized the holding in Florence as being
distinguishable from issues related to taking DNA samples from
arrestees because the purpose and nature of the search in Florence was
consistent with the reason for the diminished expectation of privacy of
arrestees—institutional security.283 These courts and commentators

that a public jail does not share the same privacy attributes as a home or office under the
Fourth Amendment); Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527 (holding that an inmate had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his prison cell).
276
See infra note 277 and accompanying text (introducing case law regarding individuals
in custodial institutions). In permitting the search and confiscation of a prisoner’s private
effects without individualized suspicion in Hudson, the Court held that prisoners have no
expectation of privacy and noted, “a prison shares none of the attributes of privacy of a
home, an automobile, an office or a hotel room.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527. Detention
facilities similarly share none of these privacy attributes. Id. (quoting Lanza, 370 U.S. at
143–44).
277
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1510. The Court held that a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated when he was subjected to invasive searches before entering the jail. Id. at
1510–11.
278
Id. at 1514.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518.
283
See Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d. 847, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that pre-trial
detainee status did not warrant a DNA swab); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 422
(3d Cir. 2011) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (stating that a statute permitting suspicionless DNA
collection from arrestees did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Julian Ellis, Florence v.
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders: The Resurrection of Bell v. Wolfish and the Questions to Follow, 90
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point out that obtaining samples of DNA to compare with DNA samples
left at crime scenes has no relationship to the security of the institution in
which arrestees, such as King, are housed.284 The majority in King II,
however, asserted that establishing an individual’s identity, particularly
an arrestee’s criminal record, is of utmost importance in maintaining the
security of a custodial facility.285 The Court noted that establishing
certainty about identity, through the most accurate measure possible,
informs security related decisions about the location and conditions of an
inmate’s housing.286
Still, as discussed below, it is likely more accurate to say that the
primary purpose of laws permitting the taking of DNA samples from
arrestees is to compare the samples to those found at crime scenes and
thus determine if there is a link between the arrestee and those crimes.287
Therefore, it is important to address the above argument regarding the
relative disconnect between this purpose for obtaining the DNA samples
of arrestees and the government’s need for institutional security that
results in arrestees having a diminished expectation of privacy.288 In
other words, is such a link necessary before courts can find that a
diminished expectation of privacy is a significant factor in the balancing
test used to determine the legality under the Fourth Amendment for
government searches and seizures performed without individualized
suspicion?
The Supreme Court cases most instructive in this regard are those
that dealt with drug testing of sub-populations of high school
students.289 What is especially relevant in these cases is not the
expectation of privacy of all high school students, which is diminished
due to the supervisory and tutelary role the school plays in the lives of

DENV. U. L. REV. 559, 573 (2012) (examining the applicability and exceptions of the Florence
decision).
284
Friedman, 580 F.3d at 856–57; Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 422.
285
See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971 (2013) (“A suspect's criminal
history is a critical part of his identity that officers should know when processing him for
detention. It is a common occurrence that [p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn
out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.”).
286
Id. at 1971–75.
287
See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Maryland v.
King).
288
See generally King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 (demonstrating that the privacy expectations of
those in custody is greatly diminished).
289
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995) (holding that student
athlete drug testing policy did not violate students’ federal or state constitutional rights to
be free from unreasonable searches); see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of
Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822 (2002) (holding that drug testing students
participating in competitive extra-curricular activities was reasonable).
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its students.290 Instead, it is the claimed additional reduction in the
expectation of privacy of sub-populations in schools that allows the
government to drug test these particular groups without individualized
suspicion.291 When approving the drug testing of students who were on
the football team of an Oregon high school without any individualized
suspicion of drug use in Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, the Court
offered two reasons why the members of the team had a diminished
expectation of privacy when compared to other students.292 The first
reason offered by the Court is related to the “element of communal
undress inherent in athletic participation.”293 The Court here referred to
the “suiting up” and “showering” of the players as reasons why “school
sports are not for the bashful.”294 The purpose of compelling high school
athletes to provide urine samples is to see if they have ingested illegal
drugs.295 Whether this purpose relates to the diminished expectation of
privacy stemming from the supposed lack of bashfulness apparently
required for high school students to play football is debatable.296
The second reason offered by the Court in Vernonia as to why high
school athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy however leaves
no doubt about its lack of connection to the purpose for the search and
seizure involved with the drug testing of urine samples.297 According to
the Court, this has to do with the higher degree of regulation students
supposedly agree to by going out for a high school sports team.298 The
Court noted that:
They must submit to a preseason physical
exam[,] . . . they must acquire adequate insurance
coverage or sign an insurance waiver, maintain a
minimum grade point average, and comply with any
“rules of conduct, dress, training hours and related
matters as may be established for each sport by the head

See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 655–56 (finding that random drug testing of
student-athletes did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
291
See infra notes 292, 302 and accompanying text (listing the cases involving high school
populations).
292
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 655–56.
293
Id. at 657.
294
Id.
295
Id. at 648–52.
296
See generally id. at 657 (addressing the lack of bashfulness in student-athletes).
297
See generally id. (reasoning that student-athletes assent to the searches as a condition of
playing sports).
298
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 657.
290
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As the Court further noted, “[s]omewhat like adults who choose to
participate in a ‘closely regulated industry,’ students who voluntarily
participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon
normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”300
While the
regulations that arrestees are subjected to are, of course, not voluntary
like they are with students who make the choice to play football,
arrestees entering jails have far more reason to expect far more intense
intrusions on their rights to privacy.301 Most importantly, there is no
connection between the purpose of the search and seizure, drug testing
urine, and the supposed reduction in privacy stemming from
requirements such as purchasing insurance, maintaining a minimum
GPA, and following rules of conduct and dress directed by team coaches.
In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Court confronted issues related to the
constitutionality of drug testing all students who participated in all
extracurricular activities.302 The Court first minimized the significance of
the point it had made in Vernonia about the diminished expectation of
privacy of athletes deriving to some degree from the fact that they were
subjected to frequent physicals and communal undress.303 In doing so, it
made even clearer the relative unimportance of the connection between
the government need that results in a group’s diminished expectation of
privacy and the purpose of the search or seizure that is permitted in part
because of that diminution.304 The Court’s conclusion was that because
all students participating in extracurricular activities are subject to
certain regulations beyond what non-participating students are subjected
to, the privacy of these students is further diminished.305 In fact, the
Id.
Id.
301
Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970–71 (2013).
302
See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 822 (2002) (upholding the constitutionality of drug testing of students in
extracurricular activities).
303
Id. at 831.
304
Id.
305
Id.; see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 650 (addressing student drug testing
policies). It is reasonable to question the Court’s assertion that all students participating in
extracurricular activities have a diminished expectation of privacy thus allowing for the
drug testing of their urine without individualized suspicion or a warrant. Bd. of Educ. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty., 536 U.S. at 822. Regardless, it is difficult to
understand how anyone could claim that such students have any less of an expectation of
privacy than those confined to custodial institutions after being arrested for serious
felonies. Taking the comparison of the two forms of testing farther, it would seem that
299
300
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Court apparently did not feel the need to enumerate what those
restrictions on freedom were with respect to each extracurricular group,
thus emphasizing that what matters is not the specific reasons for the
restrictions or their connection to the particular search or seizure at issue,
but the fact that the restrictions in some way create a diminished
expectation of privacy.306 This diminution in the privacy expectation of
students participating in extracurricular activities while not related to the
need to drug test them, is according the Court, a significant factor in
allowing this search and seizure without individualized suspicion.307
What is beyond dispute is that the extent of the intrusion involved in
taking a swab from the cheek of a detainee is far less than that involved
in the full body search that the Court permitted in Florence.308 It would
be something of an anomaly to determine that the highly intrusive full
body search of someone detained for even a minor offense is permissible
under the Fourth Amendment but a far less intrusive search (when the
uses of the sample are limited as in the Maryland statute at issue in King
II) done only for those arrested for serious crimes is not.309 There is then
at least one clear conclusion that can be drawn from previous holdings of
the Supreme Court regarding the balancing test to determine the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of searches done of arrestees in custodial
institutions.310 Due to the significantly diminished expectations of
privacy of such detainees, limited non-arbitrary searches and seizures
affected without individualized suspicion are permitted to accomplish
appropriate governmental purposes.311

compelling teenagers to urinate, sometimes while being observed to insure the integrity of
the samples provided, is more embarrassing than swabbing the cheeks for DNA. Such
embarrassment is relevant to the extent of the government intrusion for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 650; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 n.7 (1989) (addressing random drug testing among railroad
employees). Of course urine samples, like DNA, can be used for purposes beyond just
detecting the presence of illegal drugs; however, most drug testing programs provide
protections against abuse of the data acquired through the tests, but not always with the
strong punitive measures of the Maryland DNA statute at issue in King.
306
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty., 536 U.S. at 823.
307
Id. at 832.
308
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (2012).
309
See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (conveying that those
booked in custody undergo extensive physical examinations).
310
See supra Part V (elaborating on Supreme Court holdings regarding the reasonableness
test).
311
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (validating extensive searches of detainees).
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VII. PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST
Courts use the primary purpose test to determine reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment.312 First, Part VII.A assesses the use of the
primary purpose test in regards to DNA testing.313 Second, Part VII.B
explains why the test is unclear in its definition and inconsistent in its
application.314 Last, Part VII.C suggests that the primary purpose test
protects the wrong people.315
A. The Primary Purpose Test as it Relates to the DNA Testing of Arrestees
The principle Fourth Amendment barrier to the government’s ability
to take and test DNA swabs from arrestees appears to be what has been
referred to as the primary purpose test.316 That is, for searches and
seizures performed without individualized suspicion, the primary
purpose of such a Fourth Amendment intrusion must be other than
“ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”317 In his dissenting opinion in King II,
for example, Justice Scalia asserted that while the Court had approved
suspicionless intrusions into interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, those intrusions were not when the “primary purpose was
to detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing.”318 The “appropriate” noncriminal investigatory purposes of such suspicionless searches and
seizures have been variously categorized by courts as “administrative,”
“special needs,” or falling within some subcategory often referred to as
intrusions based on “general reasonableness.”319 Regardless of what
they are called, the definition, interpretation, and application of such
approaches to suspicionless searches and seizures has been inconsistent,
confusing, and often not based on the real values behind the Fourth
Amendment.320 This Part also examines the meaning or meanings of the
See generally City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000) (elaborating on the
primary purpose test).
313
See infra Part VII.A (applying the primary purpose test to DNA testing).
314
See infra Part VII.B (insinuating that the test is unclear).
315
See infra Part VII.C (suggesting there is no good reason that the primary purpose test
may protect the wrong people).
316
Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 (2013).
317
Id. (quoting Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38).
318
Id. at 1981–82.
319
See Camara v. Municipal Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (stating
“administrative” searches are significant intrusions on Fourth Amendment interests); see
also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (discussing “special needs”
searches); Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 405 (5th Cir.
2002) (referring to the Supreme Court’s application of a “general reasonableness” test that
was articulated in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971)).
320
See infra Part VII.A (elaborating on the inconsistencies in primary purpose test).
312
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primary purpose test as formulated by the Supreme Court and explores
whether the primary purpose of a suspicionless search or seizure should
be an integral factor in a determination of its legality under the Fourth
Amendment.321
The government in King II identified two purposes for taking DNA
samples from those arrested for serious crimes.322 As discussed above,
the first purpose is to assist in the accurate identification of arrestees.323
This is akin to the use of fingerprints in allowing the authorities to learn,
among other things, if the arrestee is who he claims he is, whether he has
a criminal record, and whether there are outstanding warrants against
him.324 It is critical to have such information for purposes related, but
not limited, to the nature of the charges to be brought, bail
considerations, and sentencing factors.325 The Court in King II spent
much of its opinion enumerating and evaluating the government’s
interests in establishing the arrestee’s identification and use of DNA
testing to do so.326 While Justice Scalia’s dissent focused as well on this
purpose for testing, he mocked the majority’s claim that identification
was the primary purpose of the testing.327 Justice Scalia concluded part
of his dissent by saying “it is safe to say that if the Court’s identification
theory is not wrong, there is no such thing as error.”328
Fingerprints remain the principle method of establishing the
identification of arrestees, but because there may be omissions in certain
fingerprint-based reports of an arrestee’s prior record or at times just to
confirm his identity, courts have accepted this as a proper government

321
See infra Part VII (discussing the primary purpose test and its potential place in the
Fourth Amendment).
322
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1975–76.
323
Id. (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004)).
324
Id. at 1972.
325
Id. When a person has been previously convicted of a crime, the charge he faces when
accused again of the same crime can be a more serious. C.f. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW
§ 5-607 (West 2006). The purpose of setting bail is to insure the defendant’s appearance at
all court proceedings up to trial. King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–73. A secondary purpose is to
assess the danger to the community if the defendant is freed pending trial. Id. at 1973.
Whether the defendant has a criminal record and what crimes he has been convicted of
play an important role in that determination. Id. Finally, when a judge decides on what
sentence a defendant should receive, the severity of the sentence is often based in large part
upon the defendant’s criminal history. Id. In certain instances, prior convictions may
permit or require a longer prison sentence. C.f. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (West
2013).
326
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972–74.
327
Id. at 1983–84.
328
Id. at 1986.
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interest in conducting such DNA testing.329 Some courts have used the
fact that DNA testing can establish or confirm the identity of an arrestee
as a way around the primary purpose test.330 The purpose of this
identification function for DNA testing is administrative in nature and
not focused on investigating ordinary criminal wrongdoing.331 If this is
the primary purpose of DNA testing of arrestees, then the Supreme
Court holdings which require individualized suspicion for such
government investigatory searches or seizures would not be applicable
to the DNA testing of arrestees.332 In King II, the majority opinion
argued that identification was an important purpose of DNA testing, and
therefore individualized suspicion was not necessary to conduct the
tests, but the manner in which the Court discussed what it meant by
identification was somewhat confusing and opened the door to the
criticism in Justice Scalia’s dissent.333
Courts that make the above argument are not incorrect in the claim
that DNA testing can and does get used for identification purposes.334
Those courts, however, are being somewhat disingenuous in making the
assertion that this should be sufficient to avoid the strictures of the
primary purpose test. States that use such DNA testing do not limit the
results to mere arrestee identification, and in fact, most acknowledge that

329
See Dist. Attorney’s Office Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 (2009)
(recognizing the value of DNA evidence); Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir.
2012) (expressing that DNA evidence is more reliable than fingerprinting); United States v.
Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that DNA is a more reliable means of
identification); Maryland v. Raines, 857 A.2d 19, 52 (Md. 2004) (Wilner, J., concurring)
(asserting that DNA is more reliable and serves the same governmental interest that
justifies fingerprints). See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, The Nas, and the Future
of Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209, 1243–44 (2010) (discounting the accuracy of
fingerprinting).
330
See Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2004) (identifying that the primary
purpose was not for evidence but reliable proof of identification); see also Jenkins v. United
States, 75 A.3d 174, 177 (D.C. 2013) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting that DNA was used
to identify the accused).
331
King II, 133 S. Ct. 1970.
332
When the Supreme Court held that the drug interdiction checkpoints established by
the Indianapolis police violated the Fourth Amendment, because cars were seized without
individualized suspicion, the Court based its opinion on the conclusion that the primary
purpose of these checkpoints was “to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000). In so doing, the Edmond Court
discussed prior Supreme Court cases in which the primary purpose of the search or seizure
was crucial to determining whether individualized suspicion was required to comply with
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 37–40.
333
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970, 1983 (arguing that DNA identification of arrestees is
important and criticizing the process of identifying arrestees).
334
See generally Green, 354 F.3d at 678 (discussing identification as a primary purpose);
Jenkins, 75 A.3d at 177 (conveying that the accused was identified through DNA).
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the primary purpose of taking DNA swabs from arrestees is to compare
the DNA to similar evidence left at the scenes of serious crimes to
determine if there is a match.335 The Maryland statute at issue in King II
allows for precisely that.336 It is unlikely that law enforcement agencies
would incur the costs associated with DNA testing merely to catch the
relatively few mistakes in identifying suspects that occur from
fingerprint analysis.337 Additionally, as Justice Scalia argues in his
dissent in King II, the amount of time needed to get the results from
DNA testing would make such testing largely unhelpful in
accomplishing the benefits of having an accurate identification of the
arrestee.338 It is far more reasonable to assume that because a DNA
match is a powerful tool that can help solve serious unsolved crimes, as
both the majority and dissenting opinions in King II agree, law
enforcement agencies are anxious to test at least those arrested for

DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/pages/collection-from-arrestees.
aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/Y9GM-5GVY. In his dissent in King II, Justice Scalia
notes in this regard:
That is certainly how everyone has always understood the Maryland
Act until today. The Governor of Maryland, in commenting on our
decision to hear this case, said that he was glad, because “[a]llowing
law enforcement to collect DNA samples . . . is absolutely critical to
our efforts to continue driving down crime,” and “bolsters our efforts
to resolve open investigations and bring them to a resolution. The
attorney general of Maryland remarked that he “look[ed] forward to
the opportunity to defend this important crime-fighting tool,” and
praised the DNA database for helping to “bring to justice violent
perpetrators.” Even this Court's order staying the decision below
states that the statute “provides a valuable tool for investigating
unsolved crimes and thereby helping to remove violent offenders from
the general population”—with, unsurprisingly, no mention of identity.
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
336
See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (discussing the statute). MD. CODE ANN., PUBLIC SAFETY
§ 2-505 (2011). “(a) To the extent fiscal resources are available, DNA samples shall be
collected and tested: (1) to analyze and type the genetic markers contained in or derived
from the DNA samples; (2) as part of an official investigation into a crime.” Id.
337
For example, in Maryland in 2013, the year the Supreme Court decided King II,
approximately 5000 Maryland samples were added to the national DNA database.
Maryland Study on Preventable Crimes, supra note 231. If the cost of taking and testing each
sample ranges from $35 to $50, the total cost for that year in Maryland would be from
$175,000 to $250,000. Id. It seems unlikely a state would incur that expense just to confirm
what fingerprint testing already reveals and providing such information for only the
limited amount of felony arrests that permit such testing. Eric Ferkenhoff & Maurice
Possley, DNA Tests Urged for All Arrestees, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2002), available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-16/news/0202160181_1_dna-samples-dnaevidence-felony-arrests, archived at http://perma.cc/2J53-TBWM.
338
King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1983–85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
335
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serious crimes to determine if they are connected to other such crimes.339
Therefore, the primary purpose of DNA testing of arrestees is very likely
that of criminal investigation.340 Contrary to the view of courts that have
found the DNA testing of arrestees to be violative of the Fourth
Amendment however, such a conclusion about the primary purpose of
such testing should be the beginning, not the end, of the inquiry about
the constitutionality of this procedure.341
There are several significant problems that attend the use of the
primary purpose test as the determining factor regarding whether
government searches and seizures require the presence of individualized
suspicion. The definition of the test is unclear and courts have added to
this confusion in attempting to apply the test. The acceptance of the test
leads to better Fourth Amendment protection for those engaged in
criminal activity than those who are not. Another problem is that courts
can and do evade the test by creating subcategories for searches and
seizures which allows the use of general reasonableness in lieu of
individualized suspicion regardless of the primary purpose of the
intrusion.342
B. The Test is Unclear in its Definition and Inconsistent in its Application
The case often cited for the use of the primary purpose test as the
determining factor in whether individualized suspicion is necessary for a
Fourth Amendment intrusion is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.343 In
Edmond, the Supreme Court held that a motor vehicle checkpoint
designed to interdict the flow of illegal drugs violated the Fourth
Amendment because it did not require individualized suspicion to seize
a vehicle.344 The Court acknowledged, as previous cases had made clear,
that individualized suspicion was not an “irreducible component of
reasonableness[,]” the ultimate test of Fourth Amendment compliance,
Id. at 1973; id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1983–85 (addressing law enforcement’s focus on testing DNA to solve other
crimes).
341
United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 232–33 (4th Cir. 2012); People v. Buza, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Martin, 955 A.2d 1144, 1166 (Vt. 2008) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting); see Julie Rikelman, Justifying Forcible DNA Testing Schemes Under the Special
Needs Exception to the Fourth Amendment: A Dangerous Precedent, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 41, 75–
76 (2007) (concluding that DNA testing of arrestees cannot be justified under Fourth
Amendment).
342
See Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire: The Supreme Court
Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 419, 422–23 (2007) (recognizing that the Court has been inconsistent with treatment
of searches due to the ambiguity of the primary purpose test).
343
531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
344
Id. at 45–48.
339
340
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but asserted that its absence was permitted in only limited
circumstances.345 The Court referred to these circumstances as special
needs beyond normal enforcement of criminal law.346 Specifically, the
Court identified such special needs in prior holdings dealing with drug
testing of students and others, the search of a business dealing in the sale
of used car parts, border area checkpoints to detect the presence of
undocumented aliens and sobriety checkpoints.347 Referring to the
checkpoint cases specifically, but including all the special needs cases,
the Edmond Court wrote, “[i]n none of these cases, however, did we
indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was
to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”348
One iteration of the primary purpose test is its use in allowing for
the search of closely regulated businesses without the traditional
probable cause and warrant requirements.349 Due to the fact that some
businesses are highly regulated, they are deemed to have a diminished
expectation of privacy when it comes to their protection under the
Fourth Amendment regarding government intrusions.350 In United States
v. Biswell, for example, the Court permitted the warrantless search of a
pawnshop licensed to sell firearms in part because the highly regulated
nature of the firearms industry made such warrantless searches
reasonable.351 In Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., the Court made an even
stronger statement on the subject writing that “certain industries have
such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of
privacy could exist for the proprietor over the stock of such an
enterprise.”352
Nine years after the Court wrote the above quote, it made clear that
for the government to take advantage of the “closely regulated” business
Id.
Id. In some of the cases in which the Court has excused this requirement for
individualized suspicion, terms other than “special needs” have been used, but the essence
of the principle was the same—that the primary purpose of the search or seizure was other
than routine enforcement of the criminal laws. Id. at 37–38.
347
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
830–32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (regarding railroad workers involved in
accidents); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 65, 677 (1989); New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 701 (1987); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976);
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452–53 (1990).
348
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
349
Burger, 482 U.S. at 719.
350
Id.
351
406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
352
436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978). Although the Court in Marshall held that merely because a
business operates in interstate commerce does not mean it falls within the realm of being
pervasively regulated. Id. at 314; Burger, 482 U.S. at 719.
345
346
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doctrine, there must be a “substantial government interest” in regulating
the industry that goes beyond merely enforcing criminal laws.353 In New
York v. Burger, the Court held that the warrantless search of a junkyard
dealing in the dismantling and selling of used automobile parts falls
within the “closely regulated business” doctrine and therefore does not
violate the Fourth Amendment.354 In so holding, the Court reversed the
judgment of the New York Court of Appeals, that the inspection
conducted by police officers was to ferret out crime and not to “enforce a
comprehensive regulatory scheme.”355 The Supreme Court rejected the
New York court’s analysis and conclusion regarding the nature of the
inspections.356 The New York Court had held that because they were
carried out by police officers and not regulatory agency officials, and that
violations could and would result in criminal sanctions, the
government’s claim that this was an administrative inspection was
merely a ruse for enforcing the criminal law.357
The Court in Burger held that the state may “address a major social
problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal
sanctions.”358 Omitted from the Burger decision was whether the Court
considered the regulatory or criminal investigation purpose to be the
primary one.359 This raises the question as to whether the non-criminal
purpose of the test must indeed be primary or whether its mere existence
is sufficient to avoid the requirement of individualized suspicion.
Instead, the Court spoke of the criminal and regulatory investigations
having perhaps the same “ultimate” purpose but different “subsidiary”
purposes—a difference in this context similar to that between ends and
means.360 Here, the subsidiary regulatory purpose was said to be the
regulation of the automobile dismantling industry to ensure that the
businesses are legitimate and that stolen vehicle parts passing through
junkyards can be identified.361 The subsidiary purpose of the penal law
Burger, 482 U.S. at 700, 702.
See id. at 701, 707 (taking note of the Court’s holding that the “closely related”
business doctrine applies to the regulation of junkyards).
355
See id. at 697–98 (discussing that the Court’s holding that the regulation of junkyards
falls within the parameters of the “closely related” business doctrine overturned the lower
New York Court of Appeals decision).
356
See id. at 712 (noting that the New York court found the statute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
357
See id. (holding that the search falls within the administrative inspection exception of
“closely related business,” rather than a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
358
Id. at 712.
359
See generally Burger, 482 U.S. at 691 (negating any clarification).
360
See id. at 713 (discussing the differences and similarities between the “ultimate” and
“subsidiary” purposes).
361
See id. at 713–14 (examining the purpose behind the legislation).
353
354
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here is to punish for possession of stolen property.362 While the ultimate
purpose of both may be to address the “major social problem” involved
here, the Court claimed this difference in subsidiary purposes allowed
for the use of the “closely regulated business” justification for the
warrantless search conducted.363
The Court in Burger made the definition of the primary purpose test
more confusing by examining the search in terms of two different
subsidiary purposes, leading to an ultimate purpose that targeted a
major social problem.364 In Ferguson v. Charleston, the Court introduced
yet another method of approaching the primary purpose test dealing
with subsidiary and ultimate purposes.365 Ferguson held that tests of
pregnant women designed to deter such women from using drugs
because of the resulting harm, both to them and their unborn children,
violated the Fourth Amendment.366 The Court reasoned that the
ultimate goal of the testing may have been therapeutic—that is to get
women into drug rehabilitation clinics and deter other pregnant women
from using drugs.367 However, the means, the use of law enforcement
personnel and the criminal justice system, demonstrated the primary
purpose of the program was more penal than administrative or special
need.368 Of course, the search in Burger was also conducted by police
and ultimately enforced through the criminal justice system, but the
Ferguson Court distinguished Burger due to the diminished expectation
of privacy of the automobile parts dealership in that case.369
Seemingly even more on point to the issues in Ferguson, were the
Supreme Court’s previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of
sobriety checkpoints and drug testing among certain other groups
conducted without individualized suspicion.370 A primary purpose of
See id. at 713 (noting the underlying purpose of the law).
See id. at 712–13 (noting that the Court found the “closely regulated” business doctrine
applicable because of the differences between the purposes).
364
Id. at 712.
365
See Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001) (holding that “special need” was yet
another exception making suspicionless searched constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment).
366
Id. at 79.
367
Id.
368
See id. at 82–84 (describing that the primary purpose was not within the
administrative or special need exception).
369
See id. at 83–84 n.21 (discussing the Ferguson Court’s way of distinguishing the Burger
facts).
370
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (holding that sobriety
checkpoints were constitutional); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie
Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (holding that suspiciousness drug testing is
constitutional); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995) (holding
that Vernonia’s drug testing policy was constitutional because of the decreased expectation
362
363

710

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

sobriety checkpoints is claimed to be deterring motorists from driving
while drunk.371 In Ferguson, a similar deterrent purpose was at issue.372
Also similar to the drug testing in Ferguson was the subsidiary purpose
of the government action in sobriety checkpoints, the use of the criminal
justice system to achieve those ends.373 While in Sitz, the Court regarded
the seizures at sobriety checkpoints to be minor intrusions, the Court in
Ferguson held that acquiring and testing the urine samples of pregnant
women was a significant intrusion.374
Yet, the Court allowed the suspicionless taking of urine samples for
drug testing purposes in a series of cases beginning with Skinner.375 In
these cases, the Court held that that the level of intrusion caused by the
testing of urine samples was not extensive enough to make the search
there unreasonable under the balancing test of the Fourth
Amendment.376 The next task then for the Court in Ferguson was to
distinguish the drug testing there from those previous cases that had
permitted such testing without individualized suspicion.377
In doing so, the Court in Ferguson offered a distinction that is
especially relevant to the determination of how the DNA testing of
arrestees should fare under the primary purpose test.378 The Court
regarded the intrusion in Ferguson as more extensive than in the other

of privacy and the need for the search); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 663, 666–67, 672 n.2 (1989) (holding that the searches were constitutional
because of the substantial government interest); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 624 (1989) (holding that that searches were reasonable because the privacy intrusion
were minimal and an important government interest was at stake).
371
See Steven Grossman, Sobriety Checkpoints: Roadblocks to Fourth Amendment Protections,
12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 157 n.189 (1984) (discussing the purpose of the roadblocks to arrest
drunk drivers).
372
See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82–83 (noting the program’s ultimate goal).
373
See id. at 83–84 (discussing the search’s objective).
374
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451–52 (examining the level of intrusiveness of sobriety
checkpoints); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (stating that the drug test was found to be intrusive
because of the privacy expectations between a patient and a doctor).
375
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624 (holding that suspicionless drug testing was
constitutional); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 664–65 (holding that Vernonia’s
drug testing policy was constitutional because of the decreased expectation of privacy and
the need for the search); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663, 666–67, 672 n.2 (holding that the searches
were constitutional because of the substantial government interest).
376
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (finding that the search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment); see also id. at 621 n.5, 622 n.6 (noting that the Ferguson Court distinguished
the extent of the intrusion involved in that case with the lesser intrusion resulting from the
drug testing of railroad employees after accidents and certain employees of the United
States Customs Service); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663, 666–67, 672 n.2 (holding that
suspicionless drug testing was constitutional).
377
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
378
Id.
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drug testing cases because, “[i]n the previous four cases, there was no
misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential use of
the test results, and there were protections against the dissemination of
the results to third parties.”379 An examination of the DNA testing
statute at issue in King II, with these criteria in mind, reveals that the
Maryland law stated explicitly the purposes of the testing.380 The
purpose was to aid in criminal investigations, and that dissemination to
third parties was considered a crime to be punished by law.381
Whether these and the several other distinctions offered by the Court
on what appears to be a case-by-case basis are valid, it does not change
the fact that the various explanations offered by the Court discussed
above muddle the primary purpose test. In Edmond, for example, the
Court’s conclusion that the primary purpose of the drug interdiction
checkpoint was the enforcement of criminal law was a reasonable one.382
What however of the state’s contention that the checkpoints were
designed to deal with the non-criminal major social problems incurred
from the sale and use of illegal drugs?383 Certainly, as the Edmond Court
acknowledged, both the direct problems that flow from drug use and
their spin-off consequences are severe.384 One might argue that they are
even more severe than those that come from the sale of stolen auto parts,
the reduction of which is a non-criminal purpose, the Burger Court held
to be severe enough to permit suspicionless searches.385 The Court in
Edmond responded to this by saying the issue is not the severity of the
problem but the nature of the interests involved and the connection of
the government procedure to the “particular law enforcement practices
at issue.”386 The Court in Edmond did not enumerate specifically just
what interests and practices it regarded as trumping the severity of the
problem addressed.
As for the determining factor regarding why the checkpoint at issue
could not be regarded as a special need, and therefore dispense with the
requirement of individualized suspicion, the Court held that the primary
purpose of such a checkpoint was to “advance ‘the general interest in

Id.
See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-505 (2011) (proposing the purpose of DNA
collection).
381
See id. (stating the purpose of DNA collecting and testing); id. § 2-512 (describing the
prohibited acts and associated penalties for improper DNA collecting and testing).
382
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000).
383
See id. at 41–42 (noting the purpose of the checkpoint program).
384
See id. (discussing the severe social harms and law enforcement difficulties caused by
narcotics).
385
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 724 (1987) (conveying the holding).
386
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42–43.
379
380
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crime control.’”387 In describing further the application of the primary
purpose test, the Court in Edmond declared, “[w]e decline to suspend the
usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to
employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating
crimes.”388
It was, however, for just such a purpose, the ordinary enterprise of
investigating crimes, that the police in Lombard, Illinois established a
roadblock.389 The roadblock was established to question all drivers
passing through about a hit-and-run accident that had occurred in the
general vicinity of the roadblock one week earlier.390 The Illinois
Supreme Court, quite understandably, based its decision on the
reasoning in Edmond, and held that the roadblock here violated the
Fourth Amendment, and that evidence of drunk driving obtained from a
driver who was stopped at the roadblock without individualized
suspicion was inadmissible.391 In reversing this decision, the Supreme
Court in Illinois v. Lidster used a different approach than it had taken in
Edmond.392 The Court in Lidster noted that, unlike in Edmond, the
roadblock here was not directed at the defendant but instead at seeking
information from drivers who may have seen the hit-and-run accident.393
The Court then found several reasons within the language and facts of
Edmond that distinguished the two cases.394
Id. at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
Id. (emphasis added).
389
See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004) (conveying the reason for a roadblock).
390
See id. at 422 (explaining how the checkpoint operated).
391
See People v. Lidster, 747 N.E.2d 417, 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (discussing the evidence
collected at the roadblock was inadmissible because it was obtained without individualized
suspicion).
392
See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424 (stating that a lack individualized suspicion does not
automatically atomically mean the practice violated the Fourth Amendment).
393
See id. at 423–24 (stating that the purpose of the checkpoint was not to detect criminal
behavior, but rather it was it was to learn information about a recent incident, therefore it
does not violate the Fourth Amendment). Even before the Court’s decision in Lidster,
which further confused the application of the primary purpose test, there was substantial
misunderstanding of the test as it emerged from the decisions in Edmond and Ferguson. See
Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test: A Roadblock to the National
Law Enforcement Data Base, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2004) (noting that the “involuntary and
suspicionless” collection of a defendant’s DNA for CODIS fails the standard set forth in
Edmond and Ferguson).
394
See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 424 (elaborating on Edmond). Lidster’s Court states:
Edmond[’s] language, as well as its context, makes clear that the
constitutionality of this latter, information-seeking kind of stop was
not then before the Court. Edmond refers to the subject matter of its
holding as “stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present
possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given
motorist has committed some crime.” We concede that Edmond
387
388
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Once again, this distinction and the decision it led to may be
reasonable, but the holding further confuses attempts to apply the
primary purpose test. Additionally it allows, almost invites, the police to
manipulate the claimed purpose of a seizure.395 For example, the court
in Lidster referred to the purpose of the roadblock here as being “not to
determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime[,] but
to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in
providing information about a crime[,] in all likelihood committed by
This invites several questions.
Does this mean the
others.”396
determining factor regarding the need for individualized suspicion in
conducting such a checkpoint depends on whether the suspicion relates
to a past or current crime? If this were the meaning of the distinction
between Edmond and Lidster, we would be left with the anomalous result
that it would be easier for the police to use checkpoints to investigate
past criminal conduct rather than the seemingly more pressing
government need to investigate crimes that are ongoing or about to take
place.397 Does it mean that whenever the police can convince a court that
they were not looking for a suspect or tangible evidence of a crime, but
only for information about a crime, that they may then lawfully intrude
upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment without
individualized suspicion? The roadblock in Lidster was established to
seek information about a hit and run fatal accident that had occurred one
week earlier.398 While certainly a serious crime, sentences for murder,
rape, and other crimes show governments’ regard those crimes as of
equal or greater seriousness than a hit and run accident.399 If police can
describes the law enforcement objective there in question as a “general
interest in crime control,” but it specifies that the phrase “general
interest in crime control” does not refer to every “law enforcement
objective.”
Id.
Id. at 423.
Id.
397
The Court’s landmark holding in Terry v. Ohio permitted police investigative activity
based on less than probable cause when criminal activity was “afoot.” 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
While the court in United States v. Hensley later broadened this permissible police
investigative activity to past crimes, that case was limited to seizures for past crimes that
were felonies or threatened public safety. 469 U.S. 221, 227–28 (1985). Furthermore, the
court in Hensley emphasized that the nature of the government interest in investigating
past crimes was less than that in investigating crimes about to take place. Id. at 228–29.
398
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422.
399
Illinois imposes a sentence of not less than four years and not more than fifteen years
for class one felonies like rape. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30 (2010). For first-degree
murder, Illinois imposes the death sentence or imprisonment for not less than twenty
years. Id. 5/5-4.5-20. Any person who leaves the scene of an accident when death occurs is
guilty of a class one felony and a sentence of not less than four years and not more than
fifteen years will be imposed. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-401. In West Virginia, an
395
396
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seize every car, albeit for only a brief period of time, that passes the scene
of a one-week-old accident, can they similarly seize every car driving or
every person walking by the scene of a one-day-old rape or homicide at
about the same time as the crime occurred?400 As with the purpose of the
checkpoint in Lidster, the assumption here would be that people walking
or driving by the scene of a recent crime at the location of the crime,
might have been there as well on the crime date and observed something
that would help the police apprehend a suspect.401 Of course, if the
seizure is deemed to be valid, then the plain view rule or observations by
the police made about an individual during the stop could authorize the
seizure of contraband or as in Lidster’s case, his arrest based on observed
behavior.402
Even more confusion, however, is created by the last words of the
Court in the above quoted passage, permitting checkpoints that ask
individuals “about a crime in all likelihood committed by others.”403 If
the perpetrator of the crime is somewhat likely to be discovered at a
seizure, does this mean the detention is unlawful without individualized
suspicion? In other words, should courts looking to apply the primary
purpose test to police procedures authorizing seizures without
individualized suspicion examine not just whether the purpose was
merely to seek information from innocent people, but whether it was
likely that the stops would involve only motorists unconnected to the
crime being investigated? To accomplish this 180-degree gyration of
individual is sentenced to life in prison if found guilty of first-degree murder. W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-2-2 (2014). For first-degree robbery, West Virginia imposes a sentence of at least
ten years. Id. § 61-2-12(a)(1). Further, any person who leaves the scene of an accident when
death occurs is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned for
not less than one year nor more than five years, or both fined and confined. Id. § 17C-41(b). In Rhode Island, an individual is sentenced to life in prison if found guilty of firstdegree murder. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (2014). For first-degree robbery, Rhode
Island imposes a sentence of not less than ten years imprisonment, and an individual may
be imprisoned for life or fined not more than $15,000, or both. Id. § 11-39-1(a).
Additionally, any person who leaves the scene of an accident when a death occurs shall be
punished by imprisoned for not less than two years and for not more than fifteen years, by
a fine of not less than $5000 nor more than $10,000, and his or her license to operate a motor
vehicle shall be revoked for three years. Id. § 31-26-1(d)(1).
400
See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422 (rationalizing the one-week-old accident roadblock).
401
Id. at 425. Additionally, the police could validly ask for consent to search the car or a
person once the detention at the checkpoint is deemed to be lawful. See, e.g., Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38–39 (1996) (expanding on what police can do at a lawful
checkpoint).
402
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 422. The plain view rule allows for the police to seize evidence if
they are in a place they have a right to be, see or in some way use their senses to detect the
evidence, and have probable cause to believe what they see is evidence of a crime. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (explaining the plain-view doctrine).
403
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423.
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what normally needs to be shown to justify the government’s right to
search or seize under the Fourth Amendment, the police would
apparently have to show that they did not have individualized suspicion
or probable cause of criminal activity regarding the seized car or
individual. At the very least, they would seemingly have to show that
they had no information that the car or person stopped had any
involvement in the crime that the police were investigating.404
Additionally, in attempting to divine the “true” purpose of the police
seizure at issue, a court would risk the very problems described by the
Supreme Court when it permitted pretext stops in Whren v. United States
based only on whether the officer’s action was objectively reasonable.405
C. The Test Protects the Wrong People and for No Good Reason
Ironically, amid the confusion surrounding the Court’s use of the
primary purpose test, the one clear principle that emerges from the
Court’s applications of the test is that it protects groups of people
suspected of crimes more than those about whom there is no
suspicion.406 The test requires the government to have individualized
suspicion when the primary purpose of the search or seizure is to
apprehend a criminal or obtain evidence of a crime, but excuses similar
suspicionless intrusions when the primary purpose addresses

When the Supreme Court in California v. Acevedo modified its interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment regarding the search of containers located in automobiles, it noted the
anomaly of prohibiting such searches without warrants when the police had probable
cause there was evidence of a crime within the specific container but permitting such
searches when the probable cause went to the vehicle in general. 500 U.S. at 565, 577
(1991). In other words, the more the police knew, the less they could accomplish. Such an
anomaly is similar to the interpretation of the primary purpose test alluded to above where
the police would have to show they did not believe a suspect was in the vehicle to
authorize its seizure at a roadblock. A similar anomaly existed with application of the
plain view rule before the Court’s decision in Horton v. California, 496 U.S 128 (1990).
Before Horton, to seize evidence under the plain view rule, the police had to prove they did
not have probable cause that the evidence they ultimately seized was located in the place
from where the seizure took place. Horton eliminated the requirement that the finding of
the evidence needed to be inadvertent for the plain view rule to apply. Id. at 130.
405
517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996); see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001)
(discussing the Court’s refusal to place any relevance on the reason why a police officer
chose to exercise his discretion to make an arrest when he could have issued a citation);
Butterfoss, supra note 341, at 484 (arguing that it would be even more difficult to divine the
primary purpose of investigative activity in the “collective consciousness” of the police for
establishing program such as checkpoints or the DNA testing of all arrestees charged with
serious crimes).
406
George M. Dery & Kevin Meehan, Making the Roadblock a “Routine Part of American
Life:” Illinois v. Lidster’s Extension of Police Checkpoint Power, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 105, 120–21
(2004).
404
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individuals not suspected of crime.407 For this apparent anomaly to be
permitted, there would need to be a substantial reason to justify it.408 In
searching for such a reason, one needs to explore the well-established
test for Fourth Amendment reasonableness.409 The use of this test has
characterized much of the jurisprudence surrounding searches and
seizures that take place without the presence of individualized suspicion.
That test requires balancing the extent of the intrusion in an area
protected by the Fourth Amendment against the government’s need to
do so.410 In analyzing the extent of the intrusion, the Court has examined
both the physical and subjective intrusions that result from the
government’s action.411 For example, the Court has permitted certain
seizures without individualized suspicion when systematically checking
for undocumented aliens at checkpoints, but not when random cars are
pulled over for the same purpose.412 In the latter situation, the Court
required articulable individualized suspicion to stop a car.413 The
distinction between the two types of seizures, according to the Court,
relates to the subjective nature of the intrusions.414 The Court found that
the regularity and other aspects of checkpoint stops create less
apprehension in the driver than being pulled over at random.415
In comparing the extent of the intrusions at checkpoints designed to
look for evidence of a crime such as the one in Edmond, with those
seeking information of a past crime, such as in Lidster, the physical
nature of the intrusion is essentially the same.416 The driver and his or
her passengers are seized in a way that implicates the Fourth
In each, they may be detained only briefly.418
Amendment.417
Additionally, no search of the car is permitted without consent or the

407
See supra Part VII (addressing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the primary
purpose test).
408
See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (explaining criminal behavior as a
substantial justification). “It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior.” Id.
409
See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013) (discussing reasonableness).
410
See supra Part V (describing the balancing test).
411
See supra Part V.A (establishing the Court’s analysis of intrusion).
412
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567–68 (1976); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273–75 (1973).
413
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273–75.
414
Martinez-Fuerte, 528 U.S. at 559.
415
Id.; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880–81 (1975).
416
See Dery & Meehan, supra note 405, at 126–29 (comparing Lidster and Edmond).
417
Id.
418
Id.
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presence of the appropriate degree of individualized suspicion.419 If
evidence of a crime has nothing to do with the reason for the checkpoint
becomes apparent, the police may seize it under the plain view rule.420
Regarding the subjective nature of the intrusion, one commentator
has characterized a somewhat different, but analytically similar,
situation in a manner that raises further doubt about the efficacy of the
primary purpose test:
As a law-abiding citizen, the government purpose
behind a government intrusion matters very little to
me—it is the intrusion itself that concerns and bothers
me. To use the traffic checkpoint as an example, I am
irritated and inconvenienced by the fact that my ability
to continue on my way is interfered with when I have
done nothing to give the government reason to suspect
me of wrongdoing. It is no comfort to me that the
government intrusion is merely for a “regulatory”
purpose. In fact, just the opposite may be true;[] I am
more likely to be bothered by a “non-criminal”
intrusion. Catching criminals seems more important to
me than checking licenses and registrations,[] so I am
more willing to understand and appreciate the need for
the government to act,[] especially since I am not a
criminal. If the stop is for a regulatory purpose, I may
be affected and inconvenienced to a greater extent. I do
not have drugs in my car, but I may have forgotten my
license, registration or insurance card, or they may have
lapsed by a few days. While the consequences are
unlikely to be grave, they will inconvenience me by
costing me time and money.[] And I am likely to be
even more upset because “I wasn't doing anything
wrong” when the government discovered my errors. I
am much less likely to complain if I am caught speeding
and the license and registration offenses are discovered
collateral to that. I am still inconvenienced and not
419
See id. at 121–22 (“the . . . ‘general crime control’ purpose versus the ‘informationseeking’ purpose might appear to be a distinction without a difference, . . . [a] driver might
wonder exactly how the stop is less intrusive just because the police are bothering him or
her about someone else”). These authors then characterize the objective nature of the
intrusions permitted by the Court in Lidster but prohibited in Edmond to be “monotonously
similar.” Id.
420
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000) (elaborating on the open-view
principle).

718

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

happy, but I am less likely to feel I have been treated
unfairly or the government has been overbearing. And a
license and registration check in the middle of the day
on my usual route to work or shopping or recreation
certainly makes it seem that traffic checkpoints have
become more “an everyday part of American life” than a
sobriety checkpoint in the early morning hours in the
vicinity of bars or a narcotics checkpoint along routes
frequented by drug traffickers.421
In any event, it is hard to conclude that an innocent person would have
any more reason to be upset about being seized as part of a narcotics
interdiction campaign than to be seized to be asked about a past crime.422
Additionally, the checkpoints conducted in Edmond operated generally
during the day whereas the one in Lidster was conducted late at night,
when presumably a motorist would be more apprehensive about being
detained.423
The second part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test
relates to the importance of the government’s need to conduct the search
or seizure in question and its effectiveness at achieving this purpose.424
In Lidster, the police established the checkpoint to inquire about a fatal
hit-and-run accident that had occurred in the vicinity.425 In Edmond,
checkpoints were set up based on, among other things, crime statistics
and traffic flow.426 The purpose of the checkpoints in Edmond was to
interdict the flow of drugs into a city that had felt the terrible effects of
the rampant use of illegal drugs.427 It is not dismissive of the seriousness
of the need to investigate a past hit and run fatality to recognize that the
roadblock established in Lidster was directed at only one crime.428 The
roadblocks in Edmond were established to prevent many drug crimes and
violence that flows directly and indirectly from such crimes.429 It is
difficult to see how an argument could be made that the government’s
need in Edmond was any less than that in Lidster or more generally about
421
See Butterfoss, supra note 341, at 487–88 (referencing a paragraph from Mr. Butterfoss’
article detailing the purpose behind traffic stops and the effects it has on innocent
individuals).
422
See Dery & Meehan, supra note 405, at 121 (comparing the differences between Lidster
and Edmond and each of their purposes for traffic stops).
423
Id. at 111, 114.
424
See supra Part VI.A (discussing the nature of government interest).
425
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 422 (2004).
426
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35–36 (2000).
427
Id. at 41–42.
428
Lidster, 540 U.S. at 427.
429
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34–36 (conveying the facts of the case).
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why searches or seizures whose primary purpose is to investigate crime
is less important than those whose purposes are claimed to be otherwise.
In conclusion, attempting to determine the legality of searches and
seizures that are conducted without individualized suspicion based on
whether the primary purpose of the investigative activity was to ferret
out ordinary criminal wrongdoing leads to results that are difficult to
understand, make little sense when they can be understood, encourage
police manipulation, and work in opposition to Fourth Amendment
principles. A more effective way to make this determination should be
used, and in fact, already exists.430
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed the constitutionality of obtaining DNA
samples from arrestees and using those samples to identify the arrestee
and compare his DNA sample to those found at the scene of serious
crimes. The Article maintains that neither the presumption of innocence
nor the arguments surrounding the Fourth Amendment are reasons for
invalidating such testing. Specifically, the presumption of innocence is
basically a trial protection and has no bearing on the legality of a search
or seizure.431 The test by which the Court determines the legality of a
search or seizure is to balance the extent of the intrusion against the
importance of the government’s interest in conducting the search or
seizure.432 The DNA testing of arrestees accomplishes the important
purpose of solving outstanding crimes, thus linking the guilty to the
crime and exonerating those who may have been wrongly charged.433
More broadly, this Article points to a better way for courts to apply
the reasonableness test to searches or seizures done without
individualized suspicion. Courts should avoid being disingenuous and
misleading when analyzing aspects of this reasonableness test such as
the primary purpose of the intrusion, and whether and to what extent
the subject of the intrusion has a diminished expectation of privacy.
When it approved the suspicionless DNA testing of arrestees in King II,
the Court deemphasized what was the actual primary purpose of the
Such an approach balances the extent of the intrusion against the need of the
government to engage in it. The first part of the balancing test includes consideration of
whether the subject of the intrusion already has a diminished expectation of privacy. The
second part of the test encompasses the effectiveness of the government’s intrusion in
accomplishing its purpose.
431
See supra notes 114–21 and accompanying text (analyzing cases that determined DNA
testing constituted a search).
432
See supra Part V.A (discussing the level of intrusion).
433
See supra Part V.A.2 (supporting the theory that DNA testing provides a more reliable
evidence to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence).
430
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test—the use of the samples to help solve crimes.434 Instead, the Court
focused on how the samples could confirm the “identification” of the
arrestee.435 Apparently this was done so the Court could avoid the
holdings in some previous cases, which held that suspicionless Fourth
Amendment intrusions were lawful only when their primary purpose
was other than to ferret out crime. This partial masking of the actual
purpose of the testing in fact weakened the Court’s holding in King II
and served as fodder for Justice Scalia’s stinging dissent.
It is undisputed that an arrestee has a diminished expectation of
privacy because of his confinement.436 What should be an especially
significant aspect in analyzing the extent of intrusion however is
compromised by the manner in which the Court has applied the
diminished expectation of privacy principle in the past. When it
approved the suspicionless drug testing of certain students, the Court
wrote that all students subjecting themselves to extra-curricular activities
have a diminished expectation of privacy as compared to other
students.437 If the Court wished to sanction drug testing students
because of the government’s need to insure that students do not come to
school high on drugs and because the schools act in loco parentis, it
should have said so. This would apply to all students and although a
debatable conclusion, would foster an honest analysis. However,
applying the diminished expectation of privacy rationale to students
because they participate in extracurricular activities was unpersuasive
and counterproductive to developing a rational way of applying the
reasonableness test. It is reasonable to conclude, as the Court has, that
one has less of an expectation of privacy in a car than in a home from the
“pervasive regulation” of automobiles.438 This hardly leads to the
434
See supra Part VII (analyzing the King II opinion on the primary reasoning for the use
of DNA testing).
435
See supra Part VIII (providing that identification was a main focus of the court in King
II).
436
See supra notes 260–88 and accompanying text (reviewing case law which established
a lower expectation of privacy for individuals incarcerated).
437
See supra notes 302–07 and accompanying text (concluding that Earl’s decision
lowered the expectation of privacy for students).
438
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985). Originally the Court held this reduced
expectation of privacy developed from the ready mobility of automobiles. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146, 151, 162 (1925). Over time, the Court developed a second
rationale for this reduced privacy expectation—the fact that automobiles are highly
regulated. As the Court wrote in South Dakota v. Opperman:
Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing
governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection
and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop
and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have
expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive
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conclusion that although the police require a warrant before they can
open a paper bag carried openly by a person in the street that they are
excused from the warrant requirement when that bag is locked up in a
suitcase and placed in the trunk of an automobile as the Courts holdings
indicate.439 Although the Court has used the diminished expectation of
privacy in these dubious ways, it should not take away from its
significance when the subject of the intrusion has a genuine and
substantial diminished expectation of privacy—as do arrestees in full
custodial institutions.440 In such situations, this diminished expectation
of privacy severely reduces the extent of the intrusion to the individual.
Finally, this Article has reviewed those cases in which the Court has
used the primary purpose test as a determining factor in analyzing
whether suspicionless government intrusions violate the Fourth
Amendment. Those cases are extremely inconsistent in both the
definition and application of the test.441 In fact, the primary purpose test
works to permit more substantial intrusions on those not suspected of
criminal activity than for those who are suspected.442 Accordingly, the
primary purpose test needs to be abandoned, or at least revisited by the
Court, regarding its role in the application of the Fourth Amendment.

noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in
proper working order.
428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
439
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (establishing that police had
probable cause to view the contents of a brown paper bag that was located in the trunk of a
vehicle).
440
See supra notes 260–88 and accompanying text (reiterating the fact the incarcerated
defendants do not share the same level of privacy as other citizens in the United States
enjoy).
441
See supra Part V (reviewing how the level of intrusion has been interrupted by the
courts).
442
See supra Part VI.C (illustrating that the courts have laid the foundation for protecting
the privacy of people suspected of criminal activity, than those individuals who are not).

